Possible solution to the Israeli boundary dispute by Weydemeyer, Arthur Lee
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1979 
Possible solution to the Israeli boundary dispute 
Arthur Lee Weydemeyer 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Weydemeyer, Arthur Lee, "Possible solution to the Israeli boundary dispute" (1979). Graduate Student 
Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3261. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3261 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI 
BOUNDARY DISPUTE 
By 
Arthur L, Weydemeyer 
B.A., University of Montana, 19^9 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the decree of 
Master of Arts 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA | 
1979 
. Approved by» 
— 
Chairman, Board of Examiners 
Dean, Graduate Scho< 
Date 
UMI Number: EP34328 
All rights reserved 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion. 
UMT 
*•—-fcf .PiL — 
UMI EP34328 
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC. 
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest LLC. 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
Weydemeyer, Arthur L., M.A,, March 1979 Political Science 
A Possible Solution to the Israeli Boundary Dispute (138 pp.) 
Director! Forest Grieves ^ • 
The parpose of this thesis is to suggest the location of a pos­
sible permanent boundary line for Israel, The boundary which will 
be used as a basis to work from is the 19^9 cease fire line (same 
as pre-1967 War boundary), since this is the boundary that Israel 
wants to have adjusted and the one that the Arab nations demand 
that Israel return to. The major portion of the thesis is devoted 
to determining: what changes in the pre-1967 War boundary are con­
sidered most necessary by Israel and are most acceptable to the 
Arabs, The identification of chanjces considered most necesssiry 
by Israel consists of a three sta^e process. In the first staj^e, 
areas of historical/reliprious sijo^nificance, economic importance, 
and military (strategic) sisrnificance for Israel in the occupied 
territories are analyzed. The second stai^e is an assessment of 
the inte(?ration and consolidation actions taken by Israel in the 
occupied territories. The third sta^e of the Identification 
process consists of an analysis of public statements by the 
Israeli government concemin^c permanent boundaries for Israel, 
The approach outlined above represents an attempt to arrive at 
an accurate assessment of which areas in the occupied territories 
are of major sip:nificance to Israel and which are of less 
importance. The countering?: Arab position concerning the boundary 
of Israel is determined from statements by Arab heads of state and 
Palestine Liberation Orp:anization leaders. 
The major hypothesis of the thesis is that the conflict arising 
from Israel's demand for secure and permanent borders, the 
Palestinian demand for a state of their own, and the demand of 
Israel's bordering Arab states for return of occupied territory 
can be reconciled. 
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The Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arab nations is 
an unusually complex problem which includes relif^ious animosity, dis­
puted territory and suppressed nationalism amon^^ its major issues, but 
the key to any successful settlement of the conflict lies in reachin^^ 
an agreement over the location of a permanent boundary for Israel, 
This concentration upon the Israeli boundary issue addresses both the 
major Arab demand for return of the territory occupied by Israel since 
1967 and the primary Israeli demand for "secure and recognized" borders. 
It also confronts indirectly the question of Palestinian self determin­
ation through resolution of the boundary question along the Gaza Strip 
and West Bank territories. Finally, the resolution of the boundary 
issue provides a means of dissipating the intensity of the Arab com­
mitment to a Jihad, or "holy war" e^^ainst Israel, a war that the Arabs 
have vowed to continue until Israel is destroyed. 
Since the Arab commitment to the Jihad stems from a deep seated 
resentment against Jewish intrusion into the Arab Middle East, the mere 
initialing of an agreement with Israel is not going to terminate the 
Arab desire to be rid of the Israeli presence in the Middle East, 
What a boundauty settlement can do, though, is provide an opportunity 
for the more moderate Arab nations to subordinate their commitment 
regarding the "holy war" against Israel to an emphasis upon furthering 
1 
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their own national interests. If only a few of the more powerful 
Arab nations can be persuaded to forgo the united Arab cause against 
Israel and turn their efforts to social and economic advancements 
within their own country, the Arab opposition would be too weak to 
threaten seriously Israel's existence, which is about the most security 
that Israel can ever hope to have in the Arab Middle East, 
The purpose of this thesis, then, is to suggest the location of 
a possible permanent boundary line for Israel, The boundary which 
will be used as a basis from which to work is the 19^9 cease fire line 
(same as the pre-1967 War boundary), since this is the boundary that 
Israel wants to have adjusted and the one to which the Arab nations 
demand that Israel return. The major portion of this thesis is de­
voted to determining what changes in this boundary sure considered most 
necessary by Israel and are most acceptable to the Arabs. The iden­
tification of chajiges considered most necessary by Israel consists of 
a three-steige process. In the first stage areas of historical/ 
religious significance, economic importance, and militsay (strategic) 
significance for Israel in the occupied territories axe determined. 
The second stage is an assessment of the integration and consolidation 
actions taken by Israel in the occupied territories. The third stage 
of the identification process consists of an analysis of public state­
ments by the Israeli government concerning permanent boundaries for 
Israel, This three sta^e approach should result in an accurate 
assessment of which areas in the occupied territories are of major 
significance to Israel and which are of less importance. The counter­
ing Arab position concerning the boundary of Israel is determined from 
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statements "by Arab heads of state and Palestine Liberation Organ­
ization (PLO) leaders. 
The major hypothesis of this thesis is that the conflict emong 
Israel's demand for a secure and permanent boundary, the Palestinian's 
demand for a state of their own, and the demand of Israel's boajdering 
Arab states for return of the occupied territory can be reconciled. 
This reconciliation of conflicting demands is not an easy task. The 
settlement terms proposed in this thesis axe not guaranteed to satisfy 
completely all parties involvcsd in the dispute, and, in fact, require 
far greater compromise on the part of some of the parties than they 
have been willing to make in the past. Yet, all of the compromises 
involved merely ask a party to forgo a sfiecific demand in the in­
terest of achieving its overall objective. This is the heart of the 
arguement behind the boundary proposal offered in this thesisj 
the assertion that the parties involved are unlikely to gain all of the 
specifics of their demands, but that it is quite possible for them to 
gain the substance of their demajids provided they are willing to re­
structure their proposals along lines that are more attractive to the 
opposition. What this means is that Israel can gain secure borders, 
but it is unlikely that it can gain the territory which it considers 
necessary for secure borders; that the Palestinians cem achieve a 
state of their own, though it will not be gained under the exact terms 
that the Palestinians desire; and that the bordering Arab nations can 
regain a considerable portion of their lost territory, though it is 
unlikely that they will be able to deploy military forces as freely 
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as they would like in these territories. Since the terms offered 
in this thesis axe hypothetical, it can not be proven that either 
Israel or the Arab nations (and people, i.e. Palestinians) would be 
willing to make these kinds of compromises. What can, sind will, be 
demonstrated, though, is that the terms proposed are very close to 
the maximum concessions any one peirty can expect to gain and still 
have all parties agree to the proposals. 
Of course, the border issue is not going to be resolved merely 
by drawing a line on a map and calling it Israel's boundary. The 
overall settlement will require a complex arrangement of demilita­
rized zones, force limitations, economic arrangements between Israel 
and the new Palestinian state, and a host of other minor details to 
resolve problems which axise due to circumstances peculigir to a par­
ticular territory. These issues are peripheral to the central concern 
of this thesis, but will be dealt with in the course of the discussion 
concerning final settlement proposals. 
As a final note, in an effort to avoid redundaJicy, vaxioua terms 
are used during the course of the essay to refer to the same event or 
area. Thus, the Arab-Israeli war which occurred between June 5» 196?, 
BJid June 11, 1967, is refeirred to variously as the 196? Wax, the Six 
Day War or the June Wax, The Arab-Israeli war which took place in 
1948 and 19^9 is referred to as Israel's War of Independence, while 
the terms Yom Kipper War, October War and 1973 used to refer 
to the Arab-Israeli war of October 7, 1973"'October 24, 1973. The term 
"Israel proper" refers to the state of Israel as defined by the 1949 
5 
cease fire line, while the term "Jordan proper" refers to that portion 
of Jordan which lies east of the Jordan River, The unified city of 
Jerusalem is referred to simply as "Jerusalem," The portion of that 
city controlled by Israel before the 196? War is termed "West Jerusalem" 
while the portion controlled by Jordan prior to the 196? War is termed 
"East Jerusalem," 
CHAPTER II 
IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT AREAS 
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Areas of Historical/Religious Significance 
The discussion of the historical borders of Israel is divided 
into two distinct periods. The first period covers the historical 
boundaries of the areas controlled by Israelite tribes during: bib­
lical timest while the second covers the develojaient of the Jewish 
state in Palestine from its beprinninsrs with the Zionist movement of 
the I880's until its culmination in the state of Israel as defined 
by the 19^9 cease fire lines. Since the very existence of the state 
of Israel stems from unique relisjious and historical claims upon the 
land of Palestine, one might expect that historical boundaries would 
be a signfiicant factor in determining ultimate Israeli borders. Such 
is not really the case, though, because historical boundaries of Israel 
have varied so extensively that everyone from the most rabid Israeli 
expansionist to the most militant Palestinian could find ample his­
torical justification for whatever boundaries he believed should 
encompass the state of Israel. The purpose of the discussion, then, 
is (l) to point out the problems created by an emphasis upon historical 
boundaries, (2) determine those parts of the occupied territories to 
which Israel possesses the strongest (and the weakest) historical 
claims, and (3) provide enough background information about the 
6 
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formation of the modem state of Israel for the reader to pain a 
basic understanding: of the historical roots of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
Ancient 
On the following pa^es are a succession of maps which give a 
rather clear picture of the wide flux of the boundaries of the ancient 
Kin^om of Israel. Althoujrh the tribes of Israel entered the area 
of modem-day Israel around 1200 b,c,, it was not until Saul assumed 
control of the tribes in 1020 b.c., that the Israelites were able to 
establish any firm political control over the territory,^ As the map 
on page 8 indicates, Saul's kingdom was a little smaller than modem-
day Israel (as defined by the 19^9 cease fire lines), though Saul's 
domain included extensive areas of present-day Jordan, Saul died in 
1000 b,c, and he was replaced by David, who made massive additions to 
the Israelite kingdom (see the insert map on page 9). Although the 
southern boundary of David's territory roughly parallels the southem 
boundary of Israel proper, the northern empire included portions of 
modem-day Lebanon, well over half of modem-day Syria and most of 
the western half of Jordan. David's son, Solomon, took over the 
kingdom in 960 b.c,, and though he did not expand upon David's territory, 
he did consolidate and greatly strengthen Israelite control over this 
2 territory through effective political and economic orgjinization, 
^Efraim Orni and Elisha Bfrat, Geopraphv of Israel. 3d ed,, 
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Prens, 19?3)» P. 202. 
^Ibid.. p. 205. 
KINGDOM OF ISRAEL UNDER SAUL 
SOURGEi Elisha Efrat and Efraim Orni, Georraphv of Israel. 3d ed, 
(Jernsalemj Israel Universities Press, 1973), P. 203. 
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The harsh taxes and forced labor imposed by Solomon created 
considerable dissension in the Israelite kingdom and led to Jeroboan*s 
3 
revolt with the death of Solomon in 930 b.c. This revolution split 
up the Israelite empire into the Kingdom of Judah in the south under 
the rule of Rehoboaji and the Kingdom of Israel in the north under 
Jeroboaim, The division of the kingdom led to the temporary loss of 
most of David and Solomon's northern empire by 880 b.c, (see map on 
page iO), though some 100 years later Jeroboam II (793~752 b.c.) once 
again pushed the northern boundary of the Kingdom of Israel back to 
the Euphrates River. Following this brief revival of Israelite power, 
both the Israelite kingdoms began a gradual decline until they were 
completely destroyed with the destruction of the Jerusalem temple by 
Nebuchanezzar in 586 b.c. The Israelites remained a subjugated people 
under various rulers until the Macreobean revolt against the Greek 
rulers in 16? b,c, resulted in the Israelites once again becoming an 
independent people. Initially, the Israelites controlled only a 
small area in the imediate vicinity of Jerusalem, but successive 
Israelite rulers gradually enlsarged the kingdom until the conquests 
of Alexander Jannaeus (IO7-79 b,c,) expanded the kingdom over an area 
slightly larger than that encompassed by the divided kingdom in 880 b.c. 
(see map on page 11). Following the death of Jannaeus, the Israelite 
kingdom again declined until it ceased to exist with the Roman occu­
pation of the area in 63 b.c. 
^Ibid. 
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This very brief review of the historical bordeirs of Israel 
during biblical times can only lead one to conclude that ancient his­
torical claims do not offer a very profitable approach for resolving? 
the boundary question of modem day Israel, In the first place, the 
territorial limits controlled by the Israelites fluxuated so widely 
that the term "historical boundaries" could apply to an area much 
smaller than modem-day Israel, or it could apply equally to an area 
encompassing all of Palestine and a sizeable chunk of Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan as well, A second problem is the fact that some of 
Israel's strongest historical claims lie in territories in which most 
Israelis express little interest in. The inaps clearly demonstrate 
that the Israelites controlled most of western Jordan throughout 
the existence of the kingdom, yet no Israeli government has expressed 
interest in retaining territory east of the Jordan River and Dead 
It-
Sea. A third complication is the fact that, at one time or another, 
the boundary of the Israelite kingdom encompassed virtually all of the 
cuarrently occupied territories except the Sinai. In nost instances, 
though, this control tended to be of short duration. The Israelites 
controlled the Golan Heights only during the reign of Solomon and 
David and for a brief period under Alexander Jannaeus, Most of the 
time the Israelite kingdom did not encompass any of the Gaza Strip, 
though David and Solomon manaiged to control briefly the lower half of 
the area, and Alexander Jauinaeus extended Israelite control over most 
l l  
Return of the "lost" Transjordan area had been a goal of Prime 
Minister Begin's Likud Party (see Leonard J, Fein, Israeli Politics 
and People. (Bostoni Little, Brown & Company, 1968), p. 118), but 
the position has been dropped since Begin assumped office. 
of this territory as well as a siaall strip of the Sinai territory along 
the Medlterranesui coastline. This final conquest of Jannaeus marked 
the only extension of the Israelite kingdom into Sinai territory. The 
Israelite control over the West Bank area (and Jerusalem), though, 
remained constant throughout the kingdom's existence. This gives 
Israel strong historical ties to the West Bemk territory and Jerusalem, 
"but the modem-day West Bank territory is so heavily populated with 
Palestinian Arabs, that only the Likud government of Menachem Begin 
has made the area a primary consideration for retention of Israeli 
control. Prime Minister Begin's policy does represent a true departure, 
for he has always placed historical considerations ahead of security 
considerations, which is the reverse of traditional Israeli policy. 
His primary concern has "been with regaining Israeli control over the 
biblical areas of Judea and Samaria (see page 11), which is the present-
day West Bamk teanritory. All of the Israeli governments have been 
determined to retain control over Jerusalem, so historical ties are 
always invoked as one of the primary justifications for this Israeli 
action. 
Recent 
From the time of Pompey's occupation of the Israelite kingdom in 
63 b,c, until the early 20th century, Jews held no political control 
over any of the Palestinian territory. During this long period of 
subjugation, the Jewish population in Palestine slowly dwindled until 
the onset of the Zionist movement in the l880's caused a revival of 
15 
Jewish immigration into Palestine, The Zionists called for the estab­
lishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, To accomplish this end, 
they undertook extensive efforts to convince Jews to return to the 
"lost homeland" and also attempted to negotiate a deal with Turkey to 
transfer political control of the area into Jewish hands,^ The Zionists' 
efforts resulted in a large increase of Jewish immigrajits into 
Palestine, but their efforts to gain political control of the territory 
from Turkey, through purchase or other means, were unsuccessful. With 
the outbreak of World Max I, the Allied powers worked on plans to 
break up the Turkish Empire following a successful conclusion of the 
war. The World Zionist Organization was aware of the Allied Interest 
in dismantling the Turkish Empire, so heavy pressure was brought to 
bear upon the British government to sponsor the creation of a Jewish 
state in Palestine once the land had been "liberated" from Turkey,^ 
The World Zionist Organization succeeded partially in their lobbying 
effort, though the ultimate result of their success was the creation 
of the Middle East problem which still pla^fues that area today. 
The basic problem concerning the creation of a Jewish state in 
Israel was the fact that the vast majority of Palestine's residents 
were Arab, If the British were to propose that Palestine be turned 
into a Jewish state, contrary to the wishes of the Arab majority in 
Palestine, then Britain would appear to be abandoning its belief in 
^Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diarv. 2 vols, 
(Beiiruti Palestine Research Center, 1970), 1» p. B, 
^IMd, pp. 59-7^. 
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democratic principles. Yet the World Zionist Organization exerted far 
more influence in British i)olitics than the Palestinian Arabs did, so 
the British had to come up with a solution which would resolve their 
dilemma. The Balfour Declaration (the basic legal document authorizing 
Israel's existence) was designed to do just that. It readsi 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the estab­
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people, auid will use their best endeavours to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood 
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in amy other country,7 
Thus the term "national home" was sufficiently va^ue to allow the 
British to assure the World Zionist Organization that the "national 
homeland" would become, eventually, the Jewish state of Israel, while 
at the same time explaining to the Palestinian Arabs that the term 
"national homeland" meant simply that Jews could emigrate to the land 
of their historical roots, but not take over political control in 
Palestine. While this approach did get the British off the hook 
temporarily, it created a situation which Biade it virtually impos­
sible for Britain to resolve the issue of who would gain political 
control over Palestine, The problems which resulted from British 
vacillation are discussed later on in this section of Chapter II, 
The Balfour Declaration raised the issue of Palestine's boundaries. 
Since Palestine did not have any definite boundaries during the period 
of Turkish control (in fact, Palestine did not really exist during this 
"^John Norton Moore, ed.. The Arab-Israel Conflict. 3 vols. 
(Princeton, New Jersey« Princeton University Press, 197^), 3« P. 32. 
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period), the participants at the Versaille Peace Conference of 1918 
had to set aside am area to constitute the "Jewish homeland." The 
World Zionist Orgamization was asked by conference participants to 
submit a proposal for boundaries of this area. The request of the 
World Zionist Orp:anization is shown on page 19. It should be noted 
that these proposals placed far more emphasis upon geopolitical 
considerations than historical ones. They represented a deliberate 
attempt to include in the Jewish state as much of the water resources, 
fertile soil gind natural barriers in this area of the Middle East as 
possible. The Versaille Conference participants regarded these pro-
Q 
posals as excessive, so the Palestine question was tabled until the 
San Remo Conference of 1920, At this conference, British, French and 
Italian representatives met to resolve final differences in setting 
up mandated territories in the Middle East. Once again the Zionists 
offered their Versaille proposal for Palestine's boundaries, but Lloyd 
George, the British representative, concluded that the historical 
boundaries of Palestine had never exceeded Dan in the north and 
Beersheba in the south,^ As a practical gesture, the French and 
British representatives decided to extend the sourhem boundary of 
Palestine to the tip of the Gulf of Aquaba, so that the Palestine 
territory would be assured of a southern port. While the rough 
boundaries of Palestine were j^^reed upon at this conference, the final 
®John and Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, p. 1^3. 
^Ibid.. p, 125, 
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location of boundary lines was left to later deliberations between 
France and Great Britain. 
At the San Remo Conference the three powers did decide that Syria 
would be under a French mandate while Great Britain would have the 
mandate over Palestine. When the mandate charter for Palestine was 
approved by the League of Nations in April of 1922, the territory of 
Transjordaji was also included as a part of Palestine. However, Article 
25 of the mandate charter gave the British the right (with the consent 
of the Council of the League of Nations) to withhold application of 
the Balfour Declaration provisions from the area east of the Jordan 
R i v e r , I n  S e p t e m b e r  o f  1 9 2 2  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  w i t h  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  
League's Council, created the separate territory of Transjordan euid 
set the western boundaries of Palestine ati 
...a line drawn 2 miles west of the town of Aquaba on the 
Gulf of that name up to the center of Wadi Araba, Dead Sea 
and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yaruk, 
thence up the center of the river to the Syrian frontier, 
In 1923 the final border auijustments were made by giving Palestine a 
small finger of lajid along the woutheastem shore of the Sea of 
Galilee, a narrow extension of territory along PauLestine'e north­
west comer and a very small chunk of territory along Palestine's 
northerxmost point. In retuim, a small triangle of the Golan area 
was given to the Syrian mandate (see insert nap, page 19). 
lOpor the complete text of Article 25, see Moore, The Arab-
Israel Conflict. 3« P» 83# 
^^Ibid. 
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UN PARTITION PLAN FOR PAIJ'JSTINE 19^+7 
THE UNITED NATIONS 
PARTITION PLAN, 1947 
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The Zionists, of course, were upset with the loss of TransJordan 
12 
from the Jewish homeland, "but subsequent British policy threatened 
the Jews with the loss of all Palestine, Since the British govern­
ment had never fully committed itself to the Zionist interpretation 
of the Jewish homeland in Palestine (i.e., creation of a Jewish state), 
the Zionists became impatient with the lack of progress in tiransforming 
Palestine into a Jewish state. Whenever the Zionists increased pres­
sure upon the British, though, the British would respond to the 
Zionists* demands by taking small steps (e,g,, increased integration 
of Jews, a larger Jewish voice in administration of the territory) in 
the direction of the Zionists* demands. These actions, in turn, would 
upset the Palestinian Arabs and ineviatably lead to Arab riots in 
Palestine. The British would then react to placate the Palestinian 
Arabs, usually through retracting or reducing the gains advanced to 
the Jews. This would cause the Zionists to increase political pres­
sure upon the British government, gain new concessions from the British, 
n and start the same vicious cycle all over sigain. This British policy 
of continually avoiding the issue, of continually making and breaking 
promises to both sides, created such a climate of hostility between 
Arabs and Jews, and between both groups and the British government, that 
the British found the teirritory virtually impossible to goveiTi by the 
^^Chaim Weizmann, hesid of the World Zionist Organization during 
the 1920's £ind 30*s, discusses the problems he faced in preserving 
Zionist unity following the loss of the Transjordan axea in his 
autobiography, Trial and Error» The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. 
(New York I Harper aind Brothers, 19^9)» pp. 290-292. 
13 
•^-'For an in-depth discussion of this situation see John amd 
Hadawi, The Palestine Diary. Chapters 10-16, 
late 1940's. Thus the British f^ratefully turned the problem over to 
the United Nations in 194?. The United Nations solution was the 
partition plan of November 194? (see map, page 20), which was accepted 
reluctantly by the Jews but refused by the Palestinian Arabs. The 
result was the 19^8-49 war between Jews and Palestinian Arabs (who 
were supported by nei<?hboring Arab states). The Jewish forces won 
the conflict and established the state of Israel within the uneasy 
confines of the 1949 cease fire line. 
About the only conclusion one can draw from the foregoing dis­
cussion of Israel's coming into being is that the question of Israel's 
historical boundeuries remains as difficult to resolve now as it did 
following the discussion of Israel's biblical boundaries. The major 
problem is the fact that Palestine was a created state, that its 
boundaxies were imposed from outside and modified at the whim of 
those nations doing the imjwsing. The United Nations effort to create 
boundaries for Israel is a further exeunple of this same situation. 
This process was reversed with the War of Independence in 1948, but 
the introduction of military strength as the determining factor did 
not resolve the boundary question satisfactorily. Since both the 
Arabs and the Jews possessed little military strength at the time of 
the War of Independence, they had to concentrate their forces on areas 
of major importance and simply hope for the best in the rest of Palestine, 
The result was a divided Jerusalem with two large groupings of Arabs 
^^See Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, 0*Jerusalem!. 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), for an account of Israel's 
extensive concentration upon Jerusalem objectives during the War of 
Independence, 
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situated in opposite sides of Palestine and the Jews concentrated in 
the center. It is not a good idea to let strength be the determining 
factor in the settlement of the boundeury issue, because the current 
balance of strength in the Middle East has left Israel with far more 
territory tl-ian it needs or even wants, but with no more hope of re­
solving the boundary problem than has existed in the past. It appeaurs 
that the best means of dealing with historical factors in any boundary 
resolution is to take historical considerations into account in areas 
of acute Jewish religious Interest (i.e., Jerusalem and the West Bank 
territory) while downplaying historical claims in other areas. Any 
Israeli historical claims to the Sinai, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights 
are so ajnbiguous as to be almost meaningless. 
Areas of Economic Significance 
Although certain portions of the occupied territories offer 
economic attractions to Israel, the economic attractiveness alone is 
not going to be sufficient reason for Israel to seek annexation of a 
particular portion of the occupied territory, because economic ex­
ploitation would be viewed as a totally unacceptable justification 
for any territorial expansion by Israel, even by Israel's few friends, 
Israel's return of the Abu Rudeis oilfields in the Sinai in 197^ appears 
to be a clear cut rejection of territorial retention purely for economic 
gain. These oilfields were by far the most valuable piece of property^^ 
in all of the occupied territories. They supplied Israel between 
75~85,000 barrels of oil a day, which was close to 60 percent of the 
^^This information concerning production of the Abu Rudeis 
oilfields comes from the New York Times. 13 JaJiuary 1975» P. 
Zk 
country's needs in 197^» and provided Israel with 250 million dollars 
worth of production. Since the Israeli's domestic production of oil 
(without Abu Rudeis) is less than 5 percent of internal consumption, 
the return of these oil fields to %ypt was of considerable economic 
consequence to Israel, Yet the Rabin government gave up these oil 
fields in the early stajs^es of the 197^ negotiations with Egypt simply 
because retention of this area some 200 miles from Israel proper 
could not be reconciled with Israel's publicly stated policy of only 
desiring "secure and recognized" borders. If the Israeli government 
wants to retain the economic benefits of any portion of an occupied 
territory, then, it will have to find areas of economic attractiveness 
which cam be requested for inclusion within Israel under some more 
acceptable justification. It is interesting to note, though, that 
most of the other areas of economic potential in the occupied ter­
ritories are located in places which can be claimed as being strate­
gically significant for the defense of Israel, 
Sinai 
Although none of the other areais of economic potential in the 
occupied territories begin to approach the value of Abu Rudeis, there 
are a few areas of economic attractiveness. In the Sinai the major 
economic attraction is oil. Exhaustive geological suarveys, which have 
been made in both Israel auid the occupied territories, indicate the 
most promising areas for finding oil are a 12 mile wide swath of the 
Mediterranean Sea running from Israel's Lebanon border south to El 
Arish in the Sinai, and in an axea. beginning just south of the Abu 
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Rudeis oil fields and running to the Sinai's southern tip. Some 
il̂ eologists also believe that a good possibility for aajor oil deposits 
exists along the Sinai's Mediterranean coastline between Barwadi Lagoon 
and El Arish, The Israeli government has constructed a seismic study 
site just off the El Arish coastline, another at Beowadi Lagoon, and 
a third just south of El Arish, Test drilling sites have been set up 
at El Tur (just south of Abu Rudeis) and in an area a few miles south 
of the El Arish seismic test station,The Israeli government also 
has announced plans for carrying out exploration drilling in waters 
near Shaunn el Sheihk and Ras Muhammed at the Sinai's southern tip,^"^ 
Since the Sharm el Sheihk area is one of major strategic sig­
nificance to Israel, one cam anticipate the possibility that Israel 
will seek retention of this area of the Sinai under national security 
claims, while quietly exploiting it economically. The Israeli actions 
in the vicinity of El Arish appear to be another example of this same 
strategy. Along with its potential as ein oil producing region, the 
El Arish "Triangle"^® is the only area of the Sinai possessing any 
agricultural value. The Israeli's oil exploiation actions along 
with their efforts to develop agriculture in the area (described in 
Chapter III) indicate a strong Israeli interest in suinexing this 
^%ew York Times. 24 November 19751 P. 2, 
^"^New York Times. 13 January 1975, P. 12. 
1 8 
The El Arish Trieingle refers to the area between El Arish and 
the old Geiza-Strip-Egyptian boirder (pre-1967 War) to a point some 30 
miles inland from the Mediterranean Sea along the pre-1967 War Egypt-
Israel border. This axea is also known as the Rafiah Salient, 
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portion of the Sinai, Although it would be much more difficult for 
Israel to seek annexation of the area between El Arish and BarwaxJi 
Lacroon and the area around El Tur on the Suez Gulf coast, if the 
Sinai dispute were resolved with a step-by-step approach drawn out 
over a ̂  or 5 year period, it would allow Israel time to drain off 
as much oil as possible from any successful exploration efforts in 
these two areas. The current impasse in ne^rotiations works in Israel's 
favor economically in this area because it p:ives Israel time to com­
plete its explorations of the Sinai and determine which areas will 
yield the most oil. There is no evidence, though, which indicates 
that Israel is deliberately stallinsr neprotiations in order to profit 
economically, 
Gaza Strip/Kest_Bank 
Both the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories possess little 
economic potential for Israel, Probably the only economic attraction 
of suiy importance in either territory is the oil potential just off 
the Gaza Strip coast. Other than the oil potential, Israel would 
jrain little economic advantage from annexin^r either territory, in part 
or in its entirity. Due to the extensive Arab settlement in both 
territories, virtually all of the cultivable land is already bein^i: 
farmed by Arabs, Neither territory possesses any significant mineral 
deposits other tham the oil potential off the Gaza coast, so the only 
economic asset of these territories is a large work force, Israel 
does not need to annex these territories in order to take advantage 
of the available workers (this is discussed in Chapter III), and 
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sriven the prolonjred economic slump in Israel in the last few years, 
the Israeli economy no lonf!;er needs an abundant labor force, 
Golan Heiffhts 
The entire Golan Heights is of some economic si^^nificance to 
Israel due to its potential for ae:ricultural production. Since all 
of the inhabitants of the territory (except some 5fOOO Druze farmers 
living in the northeastern comer of the territory) fled durin;^ the 
1967 War,^^ Israel was left with some 4^00 square miles of moderate to 
cood a^^ricultural land. The area shows excellent potential for 
raising wheat, cotton and some veeretables, but its primary economic 
attraction to Israel stems from its potential for beef production. 
Since Israel is a very small, heavily populated nation, the country 
cajinot afford to use its precious as;ricultural land for cattle 
production. Consequently, Israel spent extensive sums of money on 
OA 
meat imports (16 million in 1967) prior to the Six Day War, A 
1968 firovemment survey of the Hei^rhts estimated that sufficient 
natural pastures existed in the Heights to support the grazing of 
30,000 head of cattle,^^ This still left quite a bit of cultivable 
land in the territory, which has been utilized for producing wheat, 
cotton and vegetables, 
^^Eliyahu Kanovsky, The Economic Imract of the Six Dav War. 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 185, 
^^Ibid.. p, 198, 
^^Ibid.. p. 200, 
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Areas of Strategic Significance 
From the time that Israel first gained control of the occupied 
territories in June of 196?, all the Israeli governments have in­
sisted adamantly that Israel will not return to the pre-war boundaries, 
and that adjustments in the 196? boundaries would have to be mside so 
that Israel would i)ossess "secure and recognized" boundaries. This 
position of the Israeli governments leads one to conclude that the 
most important territories or portions of territories are those with 
the most strategic value for the defense of Israel, Although this 
22 conclusion is not always valid, the Israeli governments, in general, 
have demonstrated a much greater willingness to compromise over areas 
of major economic or religious significance than they have concerning 
areais of major strategic value. Consequently, all of the areas of 
major strategic significance in the occupied territories must be viewed 
as prime candidates for amnexation or for inclusion within ssones of 
Israeli military control. The only exception to this rule occurs in 
certain instances where annexation of a strategically significant 
area would require the inclusion of vast areas of limited strategic 
value. In these situations the Israeli governments have demonstrated 
a willingness to relenquish their hold on the axea as long as no Arab 
opponent regains the strategic value of the position, 
22The occupied territory which all Israeli governments have placed 
the most importance upon is E^t Jerusalem, which is of limited stra­
tegic value (this is discussed later in this chapter) but of immense 
historical and religious value. Also, in the West Bank territory, 
the Begin government has made religious considerations more important 
than strategic considerations in determining the areas in which his 
government is most interested in retaining an Israeli presence. 
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Sinai 
A prime example of this latter approach is seen in the Israeli's 
withdrawal from the strategic passes in the Sinai, There are four 
strategically significant passes in the Sinai; Mitla» Gidi, Wadi Ras 
Sur and Wadi Garadal, The former two axe the most important for Israel, 
since they hold the key to defense of the entire Sinai, An Israeli 
P'eneral estimated that am Israeli force solidly entrenched in these 
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two passes could hold off an E^ptian force seven times larger. 
They are also of major strategic significauice because these passes 
guard the most desirable invasion route between Egypt and Israel, Most 
of the Sinai south of these passes is a mass of virtually inpenetrable 
mountains, while the flat coastline north of the passes is dominated 
by shifting saind dunes which cannot be traversed by military vehicles. 
Thus any Egyptian invasion force moving along this area would be con­
fined to the one northern Sinai highway, making it an easy target for 
Israeli planes. An Egyptian force which made its way through Mitla 
and Cidi passes, though, would have relatively flat, easily travers­
able terrain all the way to Israel proper. The Rabin government 
agreed to withdraw from these passes as port of the second Egypt-
Israel Sinai Withdrawal Accord of 1975t but the passes were not turned 
over to Egyptiem forces. Under the terms of the agreement, the passes 
were occupied by American observers and United Nations forces, thus 
insuring that the strategic advantage of the Sinai passes would not 
be held by either side. One can anticipate that, in the event of a 
^%ew York Times, 12 February 1975, P* 3» 
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final E^ptisui-Israeli peace agreement in the Sinai, that Israel will 
insist upon no Egyptian military forces or fortifications in these 
passes. 
There is one other area of major strategic sijsrnificance to 
Israel in the Sinai, alon^^ with several other areas of lesser stra­
tegic importance, Israel's major strategic concern in this territory 
is the Straits of Tiran located at the southern tip of the Sinai (Sharm 
el Sheihk). Israel is vitally concerned about this area because the 
military force which controls the Sharm el Sheihk axea controls access 
through the Straits of Tiran to Israel's southern port of Eilat. The 
only deep water shipping channel through the Straits of Tiran is a veiry 
narrow corridor (800-1,000 yards wide) which runs along the western 
side of the Saudia Arabian island of Tiran, some four miles from the 
Sinai coastline. The shipping lajie is too narrow to allow much 
maneuverability, so the ships passing through this channel are at the 
mercy of guns positioned along the Sinai coastline. If this channel 
is closed, Israel is limited to their two Mediterranean ports. Such 
a development would create considerable transportation problems within 
Israel, it would close down the oil pipeline from Eilat to Ashkalon, 
ajid it would deal a severe psychological blow to the Israeli's con­
viction that they can defend their country against Arab aggressiveness. 
The fact that both the 1956 auid 196? Israeli suprise attacks against 
Egyptian forces immediately followed an Egyptian blockade of the Straits 
of Tiran points out just how much strategic significance is attached 
to this area by Israel, 
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There are three other areas alonsr the pre-1967 War Ecypt-
Israel boundary that are of some stratesric si^mificance to Israel, 
though of considerably less importance than Sharm el Sheihk, The 
Israeli's are concerned about the vulnerability of Eilat, located at 
the tip of the Gulf of Aquaba. The pre-1967 Wsir boundary intersected 
the Gulf of Aquaba only a few miles south of Eilat. Consequently, it 
would require only a very short advamcement for an E^ryptian force 
to capture Eilat and cut off Israeli access to the Red Sea. Several 
Israeli ffovemments have expressed am interest in providing a ten to 
fifteen mile wide cushion between Eilat and the Egyptian border in 
the area. A second axea. of Israeli strategic interest is the northern­
most part of the Sinai along the Mediterranean coast. This area would 
provide an Egyptian force the quickest access to the heavily populated 
regions of Israel, so the Israelis* have expressed interest in extend­
ing Israel's pre-i967 War boundary to include some of this territoiy. 
Given the extensive Israeli settlement efforts in this area since 
1975 (discussed in Chapter III), one can expect the Israeli govern­
ment to place increasing emphasis upon the strategic significance of 
this area. A third location that is considered of strategic signif­
icance is the crossroads areas between Eilat auid El Arish, The first 
of these is the Abu Aweigila-Kusseima region, while the second is 
near Kuntilla, north of Eilat. The Rabin government wanted to retain 
^^Yigal Allon expressed the Rabin government's interest in this 
area (Yigal Allon, "Israeli The Case for Defensible Borders," 
Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976)* 48-49.), and implied that Israel 
should retain control of a ten to fifteen mile wide strip of the Sinai 
runninsr from the MediteirraJiean to the Gulf of Aquaba. 
32 
Israeli control of these crossroads areas because they form the inter­
section points on the main land routes from the Sinai to Beersheba 
and Eilat. Although the strategic areas in this portion of the Sinai 
are located quite some distance from each other, the easiest means for 
Israel to resolve its security problems alon<^ the Sinai frontier is to 
extend its southern boundary ten to fifteen miles into the Sinai. The 
Rabin srovemment au3opted this approach, and the Be^in government has 
taken the same position, thouffh it advocates extension of Israeli 
military control into the area. throu^?h the creation of a security 
25 corridor rather than annexation of territory. 
There is one other important security consideration for Israel 
in the Sinai. Since there jure only four major military airfields 
within Israel proper, the country is extremely vulnerable to a sur­
prise attack. Durinp^ the occupation of the Sinai, Israel constructed 
four airfields in the territory, Bir Gifffaufa near the Gidi and Mitla 
passes, Ofira near Sharm el Sheihk, Eitam neair El Arish, and Etzion 
near Eilat (see map, pa^re 57), The Begin government concedes that 
Bir Oifflrafa aind Ofira will have to be dismajitled, but the Eitam auid 
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Etzion fields are considered vital to Israel's national defense. 
These two fields provide vital dispersal of Israel's aircraft, and 
they also provide needed bases for l^iandling Israel's vastly increased 
air force (it is three times larger now than in I967). From Etzion 
the Israeli air force is within quick striking distance of Shspnn el 
2S 
New York Times. 17 December 1977» p. 1. 
^"All of Begin's peace proposals call for Israeli withdrawal far 
beyond the areas where Bir Gifgafa and Ofira are located. 
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Sheihk ajid the entire Gulf of Aquaba, while the Eitsim field provides 
a superb field for protectin^r Israel's Mediterranean coastline. To 
move these fields into Israel proper would be enormously expensive 
(one billion for Etzion alone), but they are located too far into the 
Sinai to be included into any security corridor. If Ej^pt and Israel 
can manage to resolve most of the other Sinai issues, one can expect 
the United States to pay for relocation of these bases in order to 
insure a peace settlement is reached. 
Gaza Strip 
There is no particular area of the Gaza Strip which possesses 
any <rreat strate^^ic significance, but the area in its entireity is 
viewed as being strategically significant by Israel, The territory 
juts into Israel proper and provides an excellent jumping off place 
for a hostile force, since it lies dangerously close to Tel Aviv and 
the heavily populated surrounding areas. Before the 196? War, the 
presence of large numbers of Egyptian troops in the territory pro­
vided a constant source of concern for the Israeli government. 
Although the Israeli government might be persuaded to relinquish con~ 
trol over part or all of this territory, once can anticipate that 
Israel would be extremely reluctant to retura it to Arab control if 
any Arab military forces are to be stationed in it. 
West Bank 
In the West Beink territory there are two areas of major stra­
tegic signficance to Israel. The first is a string of mountains run­
ning the length of the present Israel-Jordan cease fire line, while 
3̂  
the second is the westernmost bulce of the West Bank area which 
borders the narrowest part of Israel proper. Since the West Bank 
territory is so close to virtually all of the vital centers of Israel, 
(Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa), most Israeli military strategists 
have ar^ed that the first line of Israeli defense against an attack 
from Jordan should be as close to the current Israel-Jordan cease 
fire line as possible. The best location for a defense line is the 
low mountain range located approximately ten miles west of and par­
allel to the cease fire line. In early 1969, the Israeli government 
adopted the Allon Plan which was designed to capitalize on the stia-
tegic advantage offered by this range of mountains and eliminate some 
27 of the strategic difficulties posed by Israel's narrow corridor, ' 
Under the original Allon Plan a chain of 20 paramilitary settlements 
was to be constructed along these mountains, 11 north of Jericho along 
the Jordan River and 9 more south of Jericho along the Dead Sea, These 
settlements were designed as a defensive line to stall any Jordanian 
attack long before it reached Israel proper, A crucial provision of 
this plan was the Israeli insistence that no Arab military forces be 
allowed in the West Bank area. Quite obviously, most of the advan­
tages of the Allon Plan would be negated if Arab military forces were 
stationed in the populated area of the West Bank, beyond the Allon 
Plan security border. 
Israel's narrow corridor region refers to that portion of 
Israel proper which begins approximately 5 miles south of Tel 
Aviv and runs approximately 20 miles north of that city. 
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At the tine of the Allon Plan's adoption, the Israeli govern­
ment denied that this territory would be annexec by Israel, but it 
did state that the line encompassed by these paramilitary settlements 
would serve as Israel's final security boundary. The Israeli govern­
ment stated simply that Israel's political boundaries need not be 
the same as its security boundaries, implying that Jordan might be 
granted sovereignity over this area as long as the Israeli military 
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fortifications were allowed to remain in place. The Allon Plan, 
in various forms, has remained the basic West Bank policy for all 
Israeli governments since 1969. Even the policy of the Begin govern­
ment, originally one of West Bank annexation, has been modified to 
the point that it does not differ much from the basic Allon Plan. 
Prime Minister Begin's policy of maintaining a continued Israeli 
military presence in the West Bank while granting the Palestinian 
Arabs administrative control over the territory's Arab residents 
does not restrict the Israeli military presence to a few pre-designated 
areas (as does the original Allon Plan), and it does provide for con­
tinued Israeli control over Israeli religious settlements in the 
territory. 
One of the effects of the adoption of the Allon Plan was a 
decreased emphasis upon the strategic significance of the West Bank 
area lying adjacent to Israel's narrow corridor. Under the pre-i967 
War boundaries, this Israeli territory presented a major concern to 
Israeli defense planners, because the distance between the hostile 
^^Time, 7 February 1969» p. 25. 
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Jordanian forces in the West Bank and the Mediterranean Sea was less 
than miles at the narrowest point and little more than 20 miles 
at the widest. Thus, an Arab military force in this area of the West 
Bank would have to advance only a very short distance to cut Israel in 
two. Under the conditions of the Allon Plan, though, no Arab forces 
would be allowed in the West Bank territory, so this narrow strip 
of Israel becomes much less of a security liability. At the time 
of its adoption, the Allon Plan proved to be the most acceptable 
solution for defense alon^? the West Bank front, since it did not 
require annexation of large chunks of the occupied territory. If 
Israel is denied a military presence in the mountains along the Jordam 
River and Dead Sea, then Israel would be forced to shift its efforts 
to annexation of some territory along the West Bank's westernmost 
bulge. In Older to provide adequate security for this area, though, 
Israel would have to annex a strip of territory between 5 and 8 miles 
wide and close to 50 miles long. Even this extensive an annexation 
would not provide nearly the strategic advantage offered by the Allon 
Plan, and it would do nothing to provide security for Jerusalem and 
other Israeli territory bordering the West Bank. 
Even under the conditions of the Allon Plan, though, the 
Israeli governments have called for "cosmetic adjustments" in some of 
the more strategically significant areas along this westernmost bulge 
of the West Bank, The most important of these is a small finger of 
territory called Latrun (see map, page 6l) which juts sharply into 
Israel proper. The tip of this area lies within a few hundred yaxds 
of the main highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, This highway is 
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the oajor militaiy supply route between Israel's major port and 
capital city, so unrestricted movement along this route is crucial 
during; any Arab-Israeli war, A small guerrilla force based in the 
Latrun area could disrupt movement along this highway quite easily 
and could even block this route for a long enough period (12 to 24 
hours) to restrict severely Israel's ability to conduct a short term 
war. Under the original Allon Plan, the area was designated for 
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annexation, and it can be expected that in any negotiations con-> 
ceming the West Bank, Israel will insist upon its eumexation regEird-
less of whatever other compromises are made. Other strategically 
significant sites include the small areas around Qalqilya and Tulkarm 
(see map, page 6l), The Qalqilya area lies a little less than 10 
miles from the Mediterranean, and straightening out Israel's boundary 
along this point would give Israel 2 more miles of leeway at Qalqilya, 
The Tulkarm point is the second closest point to the Mediterranean, so 
the Israelis' would like to widen their country slightly at this point. 
These three areas are about the only areas in this pairt of the West 
BaJik where any "cosmetic" adjustments need be made. Any other border 
straightening along this narrow corridor would require extensive juJdi-
tions of territory to Israel proper, 
Golan Heights 
In the Golan Heights the entire area is considered strateg­
ically significant. Since the territory is quite small (444 square 
29 
Time, 7 February 1969t P. 25. 
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miles ) and borders Israel's most hostile Arab neighbor (Syria), all 
the Israeli governments since 196? have indicated that they had no 
intention of making extensive compromises in the Golaui Heights, 
Also, this area forms the headwaters of the Jordsm River, Israel's 
major source of water. It is extremely important to Israel that this 
water supply not be disrupted. It is difficult to assess whether cer­
tain areas of the Golan Heights are more strategically significant than 
others, because two of the major features which determine an area's 
military slgnflcance, elevation aiid proximity to Israel jnroper, are 
not found in the same place in any part of the Golan Heights, The 
Heights is a sloping plateau which begins at about 500 to 700 feet 
above sea level along the pre-1967 War boundary and rises quickly to 
an altitude to 3#500 to 4,000 feet along the easteimmost reaches of 
Israeli controlled territory. Thus, all of the high ground is located 
at the greatest distsmce from Israel proper, and since the territory 
slopes gradually up all the way to the current cease fire line, 
it is difficult to point out any one strip of territory running 
across the Heights that is significantly easier to defend than a point 
either In front or behind this designated strip. Much of the Heights 
is dotted with steep, irugged gorges which limit milltairy maneuver­
ability, but the Golan Heights terrain, in general, is not rtigged 
enough to prevent an invading army from deploying its forces widely. 
Consequently, Israel could not choke off an invasion simply by con­
trolling several key positions as is the case with the passes in the 
Sinai, In fact, the only good choke point is an area north of 
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30 Quneitra, between that town and Mt, Hermon,*^ 
The apparent Israeli strate^ in the Golan Heights seems to be 
one of keepin;;^ Syrian forces as far removed from Israel proper as 
possible. Since the slightest compromise with the Syrians would have 
Israeli forces backing downhill with Syriauis moving into advantageous 
positions above, the Israelis* will probably limit any territorial con­
cessions to the portion of the Heights farthest from Israel proper. 
This approach leaves a little room for compromise in the central 
GolaJi Heights area (around Quneitra) with very limited room for com-
Xxromise in the northern end of the territory. Since the Israeli 
territory north of the Sea of Galilee is dangerously vulnerable to 
being pinched off against the sea, Israel cannot afford to allow 
Syrian troops closer to Israel proper at one point than at another. 
Given this situation, one can expect Israel to seek ajinexation of a 
swath of Golan Heights territory of approximately equal width along 
the entire length of the pre-i967 War boundary. 
East Jerusalem 
East Jerusalem is currently of some strategic significance to 
Israel, Prior to the 196? War it was of major strategic significance 
because large numbers of Jordanian troops were stationed in that por­
tion of the city, immediately awijacent to one of the major population 
centers of Israel, It is virtually impossible for a similar situation 
30 
During the 1973 War, 1 brigade of Israeli troops, supported 
by 100 tanks, held off 2 Syrian divisions for 3 days in this area. 
For am account of the battle, see Nadav Safran, Israeli The Embattled 
Ally. (Cambridge, Masst Harvard University Press, 1978)» PP. 286-301, 
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to developt though» since Israel would never allow any sizeable Arab 
troop concentration to be stationed anywhere in the West Bank region. 
The area does have strategic significance for prevention of terrorist 
actst even if the West Bank is demilitarized. No one in Israel wants 
to see the Holy City divided by barbed wire and nine fields ̂ ^;ain» 
but this is a possibility should the area come under Palestinian 
Arab control. If Israel controls the entire city, though, the anti-
terrorist measures (i.e,* checkpoints and electronic surveillance 
devices) could be placed at the outskirts of the city, allowing for 
unrestricted movement of Jerusalem's residents and visitors. The 
most acceptable means for preventing terrorist attacks in Jerusalem 
euid entry of Fsilestinian terrorists into Israel happens to be one of 
the least acceptable political solutions for Jerusalem to the Arab 
states. It appears very likely that, if Israel is going to gain 
Arab acceptance of an overall peace settlement, compromises will have 
to be made in Jerusalem which could lesid to difficulties in control­
ling movement of terrorists in and out of Israel through Jerusalem, 
These problems controlling terrorists may well be the price that 
Israel has to pay if it wants to gain other more important security 
azrangements in the other occupied territories, 
Lebanon 
The territory in Lebenon, recently occupied by Israel, is of 
some strategic significance now, though the long term stxrategic value 
of this area to Israel is somewhat ambigious. In essence, Israel's 
continued occuiation of the other territories is what led to the 
problem In Lebanon. Israel's adamant refusal to accept a Palestinian 
state In the Middle East has been the prime notlvatlonal force for 
the Palestinian resistance movement. As the strength of the Pales­
tinians grew, they became a threat to several of the Arab states out 
of which they operatedi first In Joxdam (until they were thrown out 
of the country following a major military effort by King Hussein's 
forces), and then In Lebanon, It was the alignment of Palestinian 
guerrillas with Lebanese Muslims which led to the Lebanese civil war 
between Christians and Muslims and which left Palestinian guerrillas 
with control over much of the area along the Leban-Israel border. 
This gave the Palestinians an excellent staiglng area for guerrilla 
foirays Into Israel, shelling of Israeli border settlements and the 
unlnteirrupted training of new recruits. Thus, what was a relatively 
peaceful boundary for Israel prior to the Six Day War has become 
another security problem to be reconed with. 
The Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon was a response to the 
I^lestlnlan presence there, but It appears that the area will not be 
a long-term strategic problem for Israel. As long as the Palestinian 
guerrillas pose the only threat In Lebanon, Israel need not be overly 
concerned. The Palestinians possess neither the manpower nor the fire­
power to threaten seriously Israel's existence, and any workable 
peace settlement In the Middle East Is likely to dispell much of the 
violently antl-Israel sentiment which fuels the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). However, this area could become strategically 
significant If the Lebanese Muslims, allied with the PLO, mamage to 
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fcain control of all Lebanon, In such a situation, Israel would have 
to consider Lebanon as much of a threat as its other bordering Arab 
neighbors. In fact, Lebanon might become even more dangerous, since 
a Muslim-dominated Lebanon would most likely become the haven for 
militant Palestinians dissatisfied with whatever peace settlement is 
worked out eventually. If such a situation develops, and Israel comes 
under increasing guerrilla attack from Lebauion, one can anticipate 
that Israel would move into Lebanon smd occupy the airea north to the 
Litajtti River, This occupation would square off Israel's northern 
boundary, give Israel ample room to build solid defensive fortifications 
and give access to the major water supply in the area. Currently, 
Israel has shown little inclination to retain a permanent presence in 
Lebanon, Much of the occupied area has already been turned over to 
United Nations forces, no plans for settlements have been announced, 
and Isirael has not even set up a military government to administer the 
area. It appears very likely that Israel will not attempt to retain 
aJiy of Lebanon in any final peace settlement. 
Summary 
It has already been noted that the only areas that can be con­
sidered of major historical/religious importance are Eaist Jerusalem 
and certain areas of the West Bank, There are a number of areas of 
economic significance to Israel. In the Sinai, these include the 
Rafiah Salient, the portion of the Mediterranean coastline between 
El Arish and Barwadi Lagoon, and the area around Sharm el Sheihk, 
The only other area of primary economic importance is the entire Golan 
Heights territory. The areas of primary strategic significance in­
clude Sharm el Sheibk^ Etzion and Eitam air basest and the crossroads* 
Eilat and Rafiah Salient regions in the Sinai. The entire Golan 
Heights and Gaza Strip territories have to be considered strategi­
cally significant. In the West Bank, the security belt region along 
the Jordan River and the Dead Sea is of prine importance, while 
the Latrun, Tulkam and Qalqilya areas possess some strategic 
significance. East Jerusalem is strategically significant for pre­
vention of terrorist attacks, while the recently occupied territory 
in Lebanon is of little strategic Importance to Israel now (since the 
guerrillas have been driven out), though it might prove valuable in 
the future. Some of these areas possess both economic attraction and 
security value, particularly the Golan Heights and Sharm el Sheihk, 
and to a lesser extent, the Rafiah Salient, The joint attractions of 
economic potential and strategic significance may not be overly Im-
portaoit, though, since economic development tends to negate much of 
an area's value as a buffer zone. It is Important to keep in mind 
these areas mentioned avove dvirlng the course of discussion in the 
next two chapters, because all of the areas noted above are of some 
value to Israel, and actions taken to consolidate the Israeli presence 
in some of these areas and the statements made to justify this 
presence give a good indication of how Israel is attempting to balance 
off economic interests and historical considerations against strategic 
needs. 
CHAPTER III 
ISRAELI INTEGRATION AND CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS 
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Perhaps the most accurate indicator of Israeli intention to 
retain control over a particular territory is seen in the actions 
taken to integrate the territory with Israel proper or to consolidate 
the Israeli hold on the area with settlements. It is reasonable to 
assume that the more interested Israel is in holding on to a territory 
the more effort will be made to integrate the inhabitants of that ter­
ritory into Israel proper and to place Israeli settlements in the terri­
tory or portions of it. Since the Israeli integration policies vary 
somewhat with each particular territory, quite often these policy 
differences serve as indicators of just how determined Israel is in 
maintaining control of the area. The settlement policies of the Israeli 
government also vary from territory to territory, and though these pol­
icies do not serve as a strong indicator of the importance of a terri­
tory in its entirety to Israel, they usually indicate which particular 
portions of a given territory that Israel is going to make the most 
effort to maintain control over. 
With the exception of East Jerusalem, the Israeli's integration 
and consolidation actions taken before August of 1973 were fairly 
modest. The amount of Israeli settlement and development activity 
was quite limited, and the Israeli governments had been reluctant to 
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increase the Israeli presence. In August of 1973 the governing Labor 
Party changed courses and adopted a different policy as their party 
platform for the upcoming elections. They advocated public and pri­
vate purchase of Igind in the occupied territories, and extensive 
development projects in the Gaiza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights 
territories,^ At the time this policy was adopted by the Labor Pfeurty, 
it Has believed that there was little if amy hope of getting any kind 
of peace settlement with the Arabs for at least another four years. 
Consequently, the Labor Party believed that the best course of action 
was simply to "create** the peace settlement that it wanted without 
worrying abour the ArabS* feelings in the matter. This policy an­
nouncement served as one of the primary catalysts for the Yom Kipper 
War, which prevented implementation of these Labor Party plans in 
1973. Under the past two administrations, though, the Israeli govern­
ment has moved, once again, toward a policy of creating the peace 
settlement it wants. The following discussion outlines the extent 
of Israeli integration and consolidation actions taken up to early 
1978, 
Integration Actions 
Administrative Integration Actions 
All of the occupied territories have been integrated partially 
into Israel, but none of the large territories (Sinai, Gaza Strip, 
West Bank and Golan Heights) have been integrated totally as has East 
Jerusalem, On June 28, 1967* the Israeli government formally annexed 
^New York Times. 23 August 1973f p. 2, 
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East Jerusalem and some of the territoiry on the outskirts of the city. 
Most of the public services, water, sanitation, telephone, electricity, 
and bus systems had been integrated immediately following occupation, 
and all barriers which formerly divided the city were torn down. 
Street sipjns were posted in both Hebrew aaid Arabic, extensive plans 
were made by the Jerusalem city council to modernize and improve the 
formerly Jordanian sector, and representatives from the Jordanian 
sector were elected to the Jerusalem Municipal Council, Finally, no 
restrictions were placed upon the free movement of people through the 
newly unified city. Residents of East Jerusalem are now considered 
citizens of Israel and are granted all the rights available to Israeli 
2 
citizens under Israeli law. 
Since none of the other territories have been annexed, either 
in total or in part, they are administered by military governments 
set up in four separate areas. These are the West Bank, the Golan 
Heights, the Gaza Strip and Northem Sinai, and the "Solomon Area" 
comprising the Southern Sinai, These military governments are "care­
taker" type governments which are designed to minimize hostility 
between natives ajid the occupying forces and to maintain a minimum 
level of change in the daily lives of Arab residents of the occupied 
territories. Each territory is headed by a military commaJider who 
has a small staff of militejry personnel and Israeli civilian advisors. 
In the sparsely populated areas such as the Golan Heights and the 
Southern Sinai, the military commander's Civilian Affairs Staff 
2 
This East Jerusalem information comes from Richard H, Pfaff, 
Jerusalem! Keystone of an Arab~Israeli Settlement. (Washington, D,C,i 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969)* P» 36, 
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handles nost of the government functions. Howevert in the heavily 
populated areas (Gaza Strip and West Bank), the civil service bureau­
cracy which had existed prior to the war hats been kept intact. These 
Azab administrators are the ones who handle all the day to day activ­
ities of government, and they are the ones with whom Arab citizens 
deal with in their contacts with government. This Arab bureaucracy 
is responsible to the military commander and is required to adhere 
to the general policy guidelines set by the Israeli Minister of Defense, 
who supervises the four military commanders governing the occupied 
territories,^ 
Although certain differences exist in the manner In which dif­
ferent territories are governed, many of these differences should be 
interxxreted as responses to unique local conditions rather than 
attempts to increase or less the degree of Integration of a partic­
ular territory into Israel proper. The administrative methods needed 
to govern the nomadic Bedouin tribesmen of the Sinai vary consid­
erably from the complex bureaucratic structure applied in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. There £U*e a number of policies though, which 
serve as indicators of Israeli intentions concerning these occupied 
territories. The type of legal system applied is one of these in­
dicators. In the initial stages of governing these four teirritories, 
the Israeli's retained the legal systems which existed prior to the 
^All of this information concerning Is3cael*s military goveimments 
in the occupied territories comes from Nlmrod Baphaell, "Military 
Government in the Occupied Territories," The Middle East Journal 23 
(Spring 1969)« 177-190. 
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Six Day War, Thus, the southern Sinai was governed under the Egyptian 
legal system, the Jordanian legal system was retained in the West 
Bank, the Syrian legal system prevailed in the Golan Heights and 
the Gaza Strip was administered under the British Mandatory legal 
system. By 1969* though, the Syrian legal system had been replaced 
by Israeli civil law in the Golan Heights, This is the only one of 
the four military government districts which is currently governed 
under Israeli civil law,^ 
Another location in which administirative measures indicate Israeli 
intentions of retaining control over the axea in the Northern Sinai, 
Since 1972 administrative actions have been taken to "encourage" 
Bedouin tribesmen to leave the Mediterranean coastline area around 
El Arish,^ When one realizes the extent of Israeli settlement taking 
place in this area (a matter discussed later in this chapter), the 
reasons for the Israeli policy of driving out the Arabs becomes 
quite evident. Also, certain administrative actions taken in the West 
Bank indicate that Israel wishes to encourstge Jordan's interest in 
regaining administrative control over the Palestinian Arags of the 
territory. The West Bank is the only territory in which Israel allows 
two legal currencies (Jordanian and Israeli),^ and it is also the only 
4 
Eliyahu Kanovsky, The Economic Impact of the Six Dav War. 
(New YorkJ Praeger Publishers, 1970)• p. 199, 
^Elizabeth Monroe, "The West Bankt Palestinian or Israeli?," 
The Middle Eaust Journal 31 (Autumn 1977)« ^0^. 
^Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 147. In all the other occupied 
territories the Israeli pound is the only legal currency. 
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territory in which the former o*ner (Jordan) pays part of the salaries 
7 
of the civil administrators. To a considerable extent the extensive 
trade betHeen the West Bank and Jordan renders the currency situation 
almost a matter of practical necessity, but the Israeli willingness 
to allow Jozdan to continue to pay many of the civil administrators 
of the West Beink indicates that Israel does not mind King Hussein's 
efforts to maintain a Jordanian ixresence in the administration of the 
area. This activity on Jordan's part is not a practical arrangement 
for Israel, since Israel pays all of the West Bank civil administrators 
as well. The only purpose of the eirrangement seems to be that it serves 
as a means of keeping Hussein connected with the affairs of the West 
Bank, Since most Israeli governments have indicated a preference for 
an eventual Jordsmian administrative control over the West Bank, rather 
8 
than a Palestinian controlled area, the Israeli acceptance of Hussein's 
action merely confirms this belief. 
Economic Integration Actions 
In the area of economic Integration, the degree of integiration 
between the economy of Israel and the economy of the occupied territory 
is determined by a number of factors. These include (l) the lack of 
restrictions concerning movement of produce and workers between the 
occupied territory and Israel, (2) the similarity of wages between 
^IMd,, p, 155. 
O 
The Begin government has adopted a policy of returning the West 
Bank territory to Palestinian administrative control, though the con­
ditions of this Palestinian control are so restrictive that Begin 
believes, apparently, that Hussein's stabilizing Influence in the area 
would not be necessary. 
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the territory and Israel, suid (3) the degree to which government ben­
efits guaranteed to Israeli workers have been extended to workers in 
the occupied territory. 
Under this rating system, the Golan Heights is clearly the most 
integrated economically of the occupied territories. Virtually no 
economic barriers exist between the Golan Heights and Israel, There 
is no restricted entry into Israel on agricultural products from the 
Golan Heights, In the Heights jjublic works project employees and civil 
servants are paid the same rates as in Israel, while in other terri­
tories these employees recieve the same salaries which existed before 
the war supplemented by cost of living increases, Israel's Institute 
of National Insurance (similar to the United States* Social Security 
Administration) extends the saune benefits to Diruze workmen in the 
Golan Heights as is provided to any Israeli citizen working in Israel 
proper. Finally, in 1968 the Israeli government decreed that all wages, 
fringe benefits, and old age pensions for Golan Heights inhabitants 
would be the same as in Israel,^ 
In the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai, the Israeli government 
has placed far more restraints on the economic integration of these 
territories with Israel proper. In these three texrrltorles, the Israe­
li's primary concern immediately following the close of the Six Day 
War was to revive the decimated economies of these teirritories and 
provide employment and relief for the thousands of unemployed heads 
of households. In each of these territories, the Israelis* develoi)ed 
9 
Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 199. 
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public works programs* set up employment eigenclest suid provided relief 
for families which were unable to find any employment. The Israeli 
govemment provided a limited amount of capital investment to encourage 
the growth of some light industry in the territories, and it also en­
couraged limited private investment from Israeli sources. Finally, 
the Israeli government allowed limited numbers of Arabs from occupied 
10 
territories to seek employment in Isirael, All of these actions were 
essentially "caretaker" in nature for, initially, the Israeli govem-
nent demonstrated a great reluctance to allow any more economic inte­
gration between Israel and these three territories than was deemed 
necessary. 
The Israeli public works, job training, and welfare assistance 
programs axe the most baisic example of the initial Israeli efforts to 
avoid full economic integration. Since the job training programs were 
designed to prepaure Arabs for semi-skilled jobs in the territory in 
which they resided, these programs minimized the economic Integration 
between Israel and the territory receiving assistance. Unfortunately, 
these programs drained large financial sums from the Israeli treasxiry, 
but made only a slight dent in the massive unemployment problem in the 
occupied territories. The Israeli government realized that if they 
were to resolve the economic inroblems of these territories, they would 
have to take a much more direct role in the economic process. 
In the agricultural sector Israeli efforts were largely suc­
cessful, The agricultural developments of these three territories 
^°Ibid., pp. 144-155» 178-184, 194-195. 
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did not suffer much at all from the 196? fighting, so the Israelis-
did not have to give a massive infusion of capital to revive production. 
The problem that confronted the Israelis'' was the creation of a market 
to absorb agricultural produce. Since agricultural production in the 
Sinai was quite small compared to the West Bank and Gaza Strip volume, 
the Israelis* were not faced with a major problem in that territory. 
Virtually all of the Sinai agricultural production (centered exclusive­
ly around El Arish) was absorbed within the local economy, and what 
little had to be exported to Israel posed no problem for the Israeli 
economy. Both the West Bank and Gaza Strip produced a much larger 
volume of agricultural goods than the Sinai did, and their traditional 
market sources (Eastern Europe for the Gaza Strip and Jordan for the 
West Bank) had been cut off as a result of the war. Since the crops 
produced in these two territories were the same kind of agricultural 
produce grown in Israel proper, the Israelis* could not absorb the 
agricultural production from these two territories without creating 
severe problems within their own hard-pressed agricultural sector. 
The Israelii* resolved the West Bank problem by reopening trade be­
tween the West Bank and Jordan, thus returning the West Bank*s tra­
ditional market. Unfortunately, Israel did not have diplomatic 
relations with most East European countries which constituted Gaza's 
market. Through extensive effort, though, Israel succeeded in creat­
ing a market for Gaza Strip products in Westem Euirope, thus managing 
to revive the agricultural industry of these territories while simul­
taneously strictly limiting the flow of agricultural products from 
these territories into Israel, 
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The major step in resolving the occupied territories* unem­
ployment problem was taken in 1968 when the Israeli government decided 
to allow much greater integration of workers from the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank into the Israeli job market. At this time the Israeli 
economy was booming and needed additional workers, the Gaza Strip and 
the West BaJik still suffered from high unemployment, so the logical 
conclusion was reached. Although the workers from the occupied ter­
ritories who did gain employment in Israel were paid Israeli wages, 
they did not gain all of the benefits granted Israeli workers under 
the Institute of National Insurance, Also, the nxmber of Arabs from 
the territories allowed to work within Israel was strictly limited, 
since wages were considerably higher in Israel than in the territories. 
By 1969 some 12,000 from the West Bank, 4,000 from the Gaza Strip, ajid 
11 a scattered few from the Sinai were employed in Israel, The number 
of Arabs from occupied territories working in Israel gradually in-
creeised until 1973* then tapered off as the Israeli economy turaed 
sluggish. 
To a considerable degree, the Israeli conviction that the econ­
omies of Israel and those of the Gaza Strip and West Bauik would remain 
separate ajid distinct entitles was unrealistic, given the conditions 
vinder which the economies operated. As Kanovsky pointed out, the Is­
raeli decision to allow free trade between the territories and Israel 
(with the exception of some restrictions on agricultural products), to 
use a common cuirrency (Israeli pound), to allow the relatively free 
^^Kanovsky, Economic Immct, p, I89, 
movement of people between the territories and Israel, and to integrate 
transportation routes between Israel's coastal plain and the terri­
tories, insured the beginnings of a common market,^^ It appesirs that 
whatever government does assume control of the Uest Bank and Gaza Strip 
will be forced to retain contact with the Israeli market and the Is­
raeli employment opportunities, at least until other economic sol­
utions could be worked out. 
Consolidation Actions 
The most concrete expression of Israeli interest in retaining a 
particular portion of an occupied territory is the extent of Israeli 
settlement and development in that area. It is doubtful that the 
Israeli government would undertake any extensive settlement and de­
velopment programs in an area unless it expected to retain Israeli 
control over it under the tenns of an eventual peace settlement. In 
the first place Israel cannot afford to sx)end vast sums of money on 
constructing settlements and moving Israeli citizens into these 
settlements aJid then abandon the settlements to the Arabs or spend 
additional money to return the settlers and all their buildings and 
equipment back to Israel, In the second place the Israeli government 
cannot afford the psychological cost that would result if Israel were 
forced to abandon areas that both the Israeli settlers in the occupied 
territories and the Israeli general public had expected to become part 
of Israel, In short, the longer that existing Israeli settlements 
^^Ibid., p, 186, 
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remain in paorticular portions of occupied territories, the more 
difficult it Kill be to return to a situation which existed prior to 
the ascent of the Israeli settlement effort. 
As of January 1978 Israel had established over 90 settlements in 
the occupied territories, and the Begin government had given approval 
for more religious settlements in the West Bank, Initially, little 
settlement activity took place following the 196? War, Gradually the 
Israelis* began building a few paramllitaoy settlements in the Golan 
Heights, then in the Sinai and the West Bank, These settlements were 
primarily for defensive purposes or for experimental agricultural 
purposes (in the Sinai), though the bulk of Golan Heights settlements 
were purely for jigricultursJ. exploitation. It was not until after 
the 1973 War that the Israelis* began building settlements in earnest. 
By 1975 the concept of "creating facts" became the policy of the 
Israeli government, and settlement building accelerated rapidly. 
Under this policy the emphasis shifted from one of limiting settle­
ments In the occupied territories in order to facilitate peace nego­
tiations with the Arabs to a policy of building the settlements in 
the areas Israel wished to retain its presence in and force the Arabs 
to come around to accepting the situation. The Rabin government began 
this policy, and the extensive settlement activity has continued under 
the Begin administration, though the major emphasis has shifted to 
the West Bank under Begin, while settlement activity under Rabin was 
concentrated in the Sinai and Golan Heights, 
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Slnal 
Presently, there are over 25 Israeli settlements in the Sinai. 
The most ambitious settlement effort undertaken by the Israelis* in 
this territory is the creation of a new city named Yamit, Yamit is 
located on the Mediterranean coast in the Sinai territory just a few 
miles south of the Gaza Strip's southern boundary (map on page 57 
shows location of Sinai settlements). The Yamit develoimient, origin­
ally conceived of by former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan as a city of 
250»000, is presently designed to be an urbam regional center to serve 
as Israel's third major Heditezrranean i)ort and to support a large 
number of surrounding agricultural settlements. In December of 1975 
only 23 families had moved into the "city" and only I85 housing units 
heui been completed, but the site was being prepared for the construc­
tion of 1,300 additional housing units, as well as some commercial 
and industrial developments,^^ By January of 1978 over 2,000 settlers 
lil 
lived in Yamit, and some 22 settlements surrounded the town. Cur­
rently in the planning stages is a new settlement program which calls 
for 10-15 more settlements to be constructed in the Raifiah Salient 
in the next 3 years,Quite obviously, Israel is moving steadily 
to consolidate its hold in this area. 
The initial Sinai settlements consisted of three paramilitary 
structures located in the northern Sinai region. These are the Nahal 
^^New York Times. 13 December 1975» P» I6, 
^^Economist. 11 February 1978, p, 61, 
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Yamt a fishing canp located in the Baxvadi Lagoon region along the 
Sinai*s Mediterranean coast, the Nahal Oiqla* a kibbutz located north 
of El Arishf close to the Caza Strip boirder, and the NaJial Sinai» an 
experimental farm located a few miles south of El Arish,^^ These 
were the only Israeli settlements in this area of the Sinai until the 
Yamit project came into being. At the time of inception these three 
small settlements appeared to be little more than experimental projects, 
but the Yamit project will probably change these plans. The Nahal 
Yam is simply too far removed to be included in the Yamit develo]^ent, 
but the Nahal Sinai and Nahal Diqla could be integrated quite easily 
into the Yauait project. 
Of the remaining Sinai settlements, two are Just south of Kusseima 
in the historic crossroads area, while another five are along the Gulf 
of Aquaba, three along the highway leading to Sharm el Sheihk and two 
at Sharm el Sheihk. One of the Shaina el Sheihk settlements has been 
in operation for several years (Ophir), but the remainder of these 
settlements along the Gulf of Aqtiaba and near Kusseima have been built 
since 1975. The settlements in the Kusseima region appear to be an 
effort to establish a presence in the strategically significant cross­
roads. On the other hand, the ones along the Gulf of Aquaba and in 
Sharm el Sheihk appear to be primarily tourist camps and resorts, Ophir, 
for example, is a large resort area with over 100 trailers and bunglows 
17 set up for tourist accomodation, 
^^Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 195« 
^^New York Times. 2 May 1971» sec XX, p, 28, 
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Gaza Strip 
The only Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip other than the 
previously mentioned agricultural settlements affiliated with Yamit 
are three paramilitary settleoents scattered the length of the teir-
ritoiy. The location of Gaiza settlements indicates that Israel is 
in a good position to consolidate its hold on the areas of the Gaza 
Strip within the Rafiah Salient region, but the remainder of the 
territory evidences no settlement concentration. These three para­
military settlements are too small and too scattered to be of much 
military value, so it would be quite easy to have them removed. 
There appear to be no plans within the Israeli government at present 
to expand around any of the axeas of these three paramilitaiy camps. 
West Bank 
The development of the Israeli settlements in the Vest Bank 
territory was somewhat different than in the other teirritories. 
Immediately following the 196? War, no settlements were allowed in 
the territory. Several of the religious parties in Israel strongly 
desired to create Jewish settlements in former Jewish holy areas, but 
were frustrated by government i)olicy. They solved the problem by taking 
matters into their own hands. In early 1968 a youth group from Gush 
Emunim declared their intention of settling in Kfir Etzonia, halfway 
between Jerusalem and Hebron, with or without government permission.^® 
^®Stephen Oren, "Continuity and Change in Israel's Religious 
Parties," The Middle East Journal 2? (Winter 1973)« 50. 
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This statement created enough public support for the action that the 
fcovemment was forced to allow the ^^Jroup to go ahead. Another major 
settlement in the West Baink followed a similar initiative by Gush 
Emunim supporters who attempted to move into Hebron in 1968. This 
move was opposed by Moshe Dayan (at the time formulator of government 
policy for goveiming the territory) who did not want to alienate the 
Palestinian Arabs living in Hebron, The Israeli government com-
xxromised by creating a new Jewish town in the suburbs of Hebron called 
Kiryat Arba, This town contained an initial population of 1,000 
emd was designed to include furhter expansion. 
Once that the actions of the religious lairties had broken the 
ban on settlement in the West Bank, the government modified its policy 
and in late 1969 began to implement the Allon Plan for settlements 
along the Jordan River and Dead Sea. Within a yeatr's time, five more 
paramilitary encampments had been set up along the Jordan River, 
Between 1970 and 1973 there was little settlement activity in the West 
Bank territory. Following the October War, the Israeli government 
accelerated its settlement construction along the security belt area. 
By 1977 some l6 settlements were operational north of Jericho and 
4 nore had been constructed south of Jericho, Given the large area 
noirth of Jericho along the Jordan River, it is somewhat difficult to 
comprehend that Israel has achieved total domination over the area 
with just l6 settlements, though this is the case. For one thing 
l^Monroe, "The West Bank," p. -ifOO. 
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Israel has converted several of the paramilitary settlements into 
civilian agricultural settlements populated by Gush Eraunim members. 
In several instances the Israelis* merely confiscated much of the 
20 
cultivable land in an area and drove out the Arab farmers. The 
Is3caeli's most effective technique has been to appropriate the few 
wells in the area or to dig its settlement wells in such locations 
21 
as to draw off all the water from surrounding Arab wells. Deprived 
of their source of water, most Arab farmers living in the area were 
forced to leave. By the end of 1977 virtually the entire area enclosed 
within the "Limit of Settlement Road" (see map, page 6l) is populated 
exclusively by Israelis*, though only 900 settlers reside within the 
22 area. 
Between 1973 an'^ Begin*s election in 1977t Gush Emunim pioneers 
had accomplished a few successful efforts at establishing maverick 
settlements in the West Bank, but they had never enjoyed the extent 
of supi>ort that the Begin government offered for their activities. 
Once in office, Prime Minister Begin proved much more willing to 
extend legal status to maverick settlements eind to propose further 
settlements for religious party members. By 1978 settlements had 
sprouted up all over the West Bankj four at Kfir Etzonia, two in 
Latrun, two at Ramallah, one outside Nablus, emd several scattered 
along the West Bank area bordering the narrow corridor region of 
^^Ibid. 
^^Ibid., pp. 401-403, 
^^Ibid.. p. 403. 
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Israel proper. Under the Begin government the number of settlers in 
the West Bank grew to over early 1978.^^ This figure is even 
more impressive when one realizes that Israel is finding it extremely 
difficult to find adequate numbers of settlers to populate all of the 
settlements constructed. The large Gush Emunim settlement of Kiryat 
Arba has doasens of apartments lying empty, which is often the case 
with other West Bank settlements. Even the extremely crowded housing 
conditions within Israel and the added attraction of very low rent in 
the occupied territory fail to induce settlers to move into West Bamk 
developments. The Begin government has responded by coming up with a 
plan to eliminate some of the isolationist problems which deter 
Israelis* from moving to West Bank settlements. Some of its features 
include better roads, better communications and better shopping facil-
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ities. It appears that the only thing slowing down the extent of 
Israeli West Bank settlement under the Begin administration is the 
fear of American reprisaJ. action if their objectives become too 
obvious. 
In her article Elizabeth Monroe argues that all the Israeli 
governments from Heir's to Begin's were, in effect, following a policy 
of creeping annexation, with the objective of gaining control over a 
large portion (if not all) of the West Bank territory, Monroe cor­
rectly points out that all of these governments were dependent upon 
support from Israel's religious parties for their survival in the 
^^Economlst. 11 February 1978, p, 6l, 
^^Monroe, "The West Bank," p, 410, 
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Israeli Knesset» and as a consequence had to go along with Gush Emunln 
demands for annexation of all of the West Beink Into Israel. There 
is little proof that the Meir ̂ ^ovemraent advocated this policy, and 
not that much more evidence which can support this argument in the 
case of the Rabin government. It can be shown, however, that both the 
Meir government and the Rabin government encountered extreme oppo­
sition from the Gush Emunlm faction of the religious parties when they 
adopted policies of returning portions of the West Bank containing 
Israeli settlers under the terms of an eventual peace agreement. The 
Gush Emunlm opposition made it very difficult for labor Party govern­
ments (such as Meir*s and Rabin's) to oppose the Gush Emunlm policy 
of retaining all of the West Bank, but it did not mean that they 
supported West Bank retention, Rabin did allow for more Gush Emunlm 
settlement in the West Bank than Meir did, but Rabin followed a pat­
tern of accepting these settlements within the confines of the security 
belt while discouraging them elsewhere in the West Bank, This patteim 
of Gush Emunlm settlements is in line with Rabin's policy of creating 
facts, of making the Israeli presence so dominating within the portions 
of the occupied territories desired for annexation (or at least re­
tention of Israeli control) that the Arabs would have to accept the 
situation. It is quite possible that Rabin believed that he could 
trade off the religious settlements around Hebron, Ramallah and Nablus 
against the ones in the secxurity belt region. 
Regardless of Rabin's Intentions, his policies left a solid 
wall of Israeli-dominated territory along the Joxxlan River. Prime 
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Minister Begin has merely extended the policy of creating facts to 
a Buch larger pairt of the West Bank. In fact, Israeli settleaents 
in the patrt of the West Bank outside the security belt region have 
been going up so fast that it is alnost inpossible to keep track of 
them (every newspaper and nagazine article one reads on the subject 
has a different total). Somewhere between 44 and 48 settlements are 
now present in the West Bank* and the Begin government has a program 
in the planning stage which calls for 20 to 25 more in the next 3 
years,Although Prime Minister Begin has announced his intention 
to return the West Bank to Palestinian administrative control even­
tually, his policy seems to be one of gaining Israeli control over 
as much of the territory as possible before the Palestinians take 
over. The Monroe thesis, then, is quite accurate for the Begin ad­
ministration, because Begin*s government has placed no restrictions 
concerning which areas of the West Bank can be subject to Israeli 
consolidation activity. The West Bank policy of Prime Minister Begin 
is discussed further in Chapter IV, 
Golan Heights 
The most consistent Israeli settlement activity has taken place 
in the Golan Heights, The Israeli government began building settle­
ments in this teixitory immediately following the close of the 196? 
War and have almost exhausted the possibilities In the territory, 
a 1969 master plan for the Golan Heights estimated that the agricultural 
^^Economlst. 11 February 1978, 6i, 
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potential of the territory would allow for a maximum of 20 settle-
ments. The fact that Israel has already exceeded this orifcinal 
estimate by at least 5 settlements indicates the extent to which 
Israel has consolidated its hold over the territory (see mapi page 67). 
Unlike many of the Israeli settlements in other occupied territoriesf 
most of the early Golan Heights settlements were civilian rather than 
military. The willingness to begin immediately exploiting the agri­
cultural potential of the territory serves as a good indication of 
the Israeli commitment to remaining in the atrea. Israel has even con-
27 
stanicted a ski resort in the area on Mt, Hermon, ' Still, the Israeli 
presence in the area is quite small (only 3»700 by early I968), given 
the fact that some 85,000 Syrians lived in the territoiry prior to the 
Israeli occupation. Yet, even this small number of civilians creates 
major problems for milltaury strategists, because the territory is so 
small (444 square miles) that there is no way of keeping the civilians 
from being cavight right in the middle of any fighting. The Golan 
Heights is also the territory most succeptlble to attack. The Syrians 
are Israel's most hostile enemy, aaid they have a maisslve militsiry 
force positioned within easy striking distance of the entire Golan 
Heights area. The willingness of the Israeli governments to press 
for settlement of this territory, despite the military drawbacks, in­
dicates the strength of the Israeli commitment to remaining in the 
area. 
^^KaJiovsky, Economic Impact, p, 200, 
^"^New York Times. 15 February 1975# P« 10, 
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golan heights territory 
A 25 settlements founded 1967-1977 1 in 1978 
IN GOLAN HEIGHTS 
1 Neve Atlv 15 Merkaz Hlsfln 
2 Snlr 16 Ramat Magshlmlm 
3 Har Odem 17 Avnl Eltan 
4 El Rom 18 Nov (Nab) 
5 Merom Golan 19 Geshur 
6 EIn Zlvan 20 Ellal 
7 Ur Tal 21 GIvat Yoav 
8 Katzrin 22 Merkaz Bnel 
9 Keshet Yehuda 
10 AnIam 23 Neot Golan 
11 Yonatan 24 Aflk 
12 Shaal 25 Kfar Haruv 




























SOURCE: Christian Science Monitor, l6 October 1978, p, 3 
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The i)articulax concentration of settlements in the Heights is 
not always an accurate indicator of which territory is the most im­
portant for Israel, The vast majority of the settlements are located 
in the small area of the Heights "between the southeastern shoreline 
of the Sea of Galilee and the Syrian cease fire line. Superficially, 
this would seem to indicate that this area is more important to Israel 
than the remainder of the Heights, Although Israel is definitely inter­
ested in expanding the snail (and extremely vulnerable) strip of Israeli 
territory which lies along the southeastern shore of the Sea of 
Galilee, the concentration of settlements might well be more indic-
itive of military and agricultural conditions in the Heights than of 
Israeli annexation intentions, A considerable portion of the Heights 
north of the Sea of Galilee is used by Israel as cattle grazing land. 
This area is also the primaiy route for any Syrian military force 
attempting to invade Israel, Since cattle ranching does not require 
many settlements over a relatively lairge area, and military defense 
lines function most effectively with the least possible civilians 
along them, it stands to reason that the Israeli government is not 
going to construct very many civiliain settlements in the area regard­
less of how much they desire to annex the territory. Yet, one csin 
expect that the extensive settlement in this area would be the final 
place of compromise for Israel, simply because it is much easier to 
compromise in an area which would affect fewer settlers (such as 
the forward areas around Quneitra), 
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Conclusion 
The Israeli integration and consolidation actions in the occupied 
territories point out a few general conclusions. The first is that 
the Israeli administrative activities are somewhat indicitive of what 
Israel plans to do about the Arab residents of occupied territories, 
but in most cases they do not provide solid evidence concerning Israeli 
intentions regarding the final disposition of a territory. For in­
stance the administrative actions taJcen in the Golan Heights indicate 
that Israel is willing to integrate the Druze residents of that axea 
into Israel, The integiation is quite easy to do since there are 
only 5»000 of them, and Israel already has a Druze population within 
the country which has been so thoroughly integrated into Israeli 
society that its members even serve in the armed forces. In the 
Sinai the Israeli activities in "thinning out" the Bedouin tribesmen 
along the northern Mediteiraiiean coastline indicate the seriousness 
of the Israeli commitment to maintaining control of the Rafiah 
Salient area. In the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Israeli admin­
istrative activities indicate that Israel has little interest in 
integrating the Palestinian residents of these teirritories into 
Israeli society, Israeli disinterest in integrating Palestinian 
Arabs is not necessarily indicative of Israeli expaoisionist intentions 
in either the West Bank or Gaza Strip, Previous Israeli administrations 
made repeated efforts to "thin out" the Arab population of the Gaza 
Strip in order to facilitate annexation,and the recent Israeli 
PQ 
See Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 181, and Time. 7 February 
1969* p. 25, for details. 
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settlement activity in the West Bank, which increasingly forces 
out the neij^hboring Arabs, is just another version of the same policy. 
The Israeli actions of economic integration taken in the terri­
tories show two signfiicant results. The first is that the Golan 
Heights is becoming, for all intents and purposes, a i>art of Israel, 
The second, and most Important, development is that the limited 
degree of economic integration between Israel and the two most popu­
lated territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is leading to 
a common market situation. Potentially, this developing common 
market could become very important for a peaceful resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When the United Nations partitioned 
Palestine in 19^8, it envisioned separate Arab auid Jewish states 
joined in economic union. At the time of the partition planning, 
the location of the Jewish amd Arab populations within Palestine and 
disproportinate wealth of the Jews led the United Nations commission 
to conclude that the boundairy lines drawn would, of necessity, create 
an impossible security sirrangement, but it was hoped that the degree 
of economic dejjendence developing between the separate states would 
tend to minimize hostilities. Since the economic and security sit­
uation confronting the Israelis* and the Palestinians today is very 
similar to the 19^8 situation, the developing economic dependence 
between Istael and the Palestinian Arabs could play a vital role in 
easing tensions, should West BaJik and Gaza Strip Palestinians become 
independent. 
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In quite a nunloer of areas the Israeli consolidation actions 
coincide with Israel's strategic, economic, and historical interests 
in the occupied territories. This is most evident in the Golan 
Heights. The extent of Israeli consolidation over and integration of 
this territory is so extensive that this strategically and economically 
imjjortant area virtually has become a part of Israel. 
In the Sinai and Caza Strip the particular direction of recent 
settlement activity emphasizes the Reufiah Salient area at the expense 
of the Sharm el Sheihk region and the entirity of the Gaza Strip, 
Previous Israeli governments placed considerable emphasis upon the 
strategic significance of the Sharm el Sheihk area. The Begin admin­
istration has not increased the extent of settlement in the area, 
has made no further efforts to exploit the oil potential in the eurea, 
and appears to be downplaying the strategic significance of it. The 
increasing emphasis that Israel is placing upon the security impor­
tance of the airfield at Etzion (from which planes can reach Sham 
el Sheihk quickly) is am indication of Israeli efforts to find altern­
atives to the Sharm el Sheihk occupation. Also, it appears that Begin 
believes Egypt will be more willing to accept compromises in areas 
close to the pre-1967 War Egypt-Israel boundary than it will be to 
accept compromises in areas close to the Suez Canal. 
One of the ireasons that Prime Minister Begin Is concentrating 
upon the Rafiah Salient region is that it has more to offer than 
Sharm el Sheihk. The Rafiah Salient has economic attraction for 
agricultural pirposes, it has great potential as an oil producing 
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region, and even greater economic potential as Israel's third port 
on the Mediterranean, Strategically, the area is valuable because it 
provides a means of cutting off the Gaza Strip from Egypt, Under 
this kind of arrangement, the Gaza Strip becomes much less of a strategic 
liability (just as the West Bank becomes much less of a strategic 
liability with Israeli forces stationed in the security belt region). 
Until the extensive settlement auid develop«ent activity took place in 
the Rafiah Salient, the general policy of the Israeli goveimments 
was to call for annexation of the Gaza Strip in its entirety, With 
the onset of the Yamit project in 1975f the Rabin and Begin govern­
ments have modified this Gaza Strip policy. 
Recent develoi»nents in the West Bank demonstrate the primacy 
of historical and religious considerations under Prime Minister 
Begin, The most important strategic location of the West Bank had 
been consolidated completely under Rabin, so the Begin government 
had no vital need to increase the Israeli presence in the territory. 
Prime Minister Begin's political party has always been committed to 
incorporating Israel's biblical regions of Judea and Sauaaria (essen­
tially the West Bank), so it comes as no suprise that his consolidation 
efforts would center in the West Bank area. Prime Minister Begin's 
concentration upon the West Bank region, though, has impoirtant impli­
cations for what might happen in the other occupied territories and in 
the Middle East, These implications are discussed in Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER IV 
ARAB AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITIONS 
Political Developments 1967-1978 
Before advancing to a discussion of specific territories* some 
general comments are made concemin«;c developments in nef^otiations be­
tween 1967 and the present. Althou^rh the cease fire of June 10, 1967f 
stopped the fijcchtin^r in the Middle East, it did not end the wax as 
far as the Arabs were concerned. The Arab states viewed the cease 
fire as nothina; more than another temporary truce in their 20 year 
old war asrainst Israel, Thus, at the time of the conclusion of the 
Six Day War, none of the borderinjr Arab states had ever been willing 
to accept the presence of Israel in the Arab Middle East. Any con­
sideration of the Israeli boundary issue, therefore, was out of the 
question. In the first peace proposal advanced following the Six 
Day MeiT, Israel demanded a change in Arab attitudes and a change in 
Israel's boundary by initiating the "secure and recognized" borders 
argument, Egypt and Jordan made the first major concession in the 
deadlock by offerinst statements of recoernition of Israel's right to 
exist as a state, and Syria finally announced willingness to accept 
Israel following the 1973 War, The Palestine Liberation Organization 
has yet to offer a concrete statement of acceptance of Israel's right 
to exist, though PLO leader Yassir Arafat has indicated at times that 
such a statement would be forthcoming if it were politically feasible 
(the PLO's Israel position is discussed later in this chapter), 
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Israel did not acree to any concessions at all until after the 
1973 War, and even these concessions in the Sinai and Golan Heifa^hts 
disen^a^^ement agreements were moderate in scope. Of course, Israel 
had not been accustoaed to thinking in terms of concessions to the 
Arabs prior to 1973# The relative ease with which Israel had won 
the 1956 and 196? camiJaigns against Arab forces had convinced the 
Israelis* that the Arab forces could be easily defeated in any armed 
conflict. Thus the Israeli policy prior to 1973 essentially was one 
of sitting it out indefinitely in the occupied territories until the 
Arabs finally agreed to the peace terms dictated by Israel, 
The Arab success on the battlefield in the 1973 War shattered 
the myth of Israeli invincibility, causing a traumantic reaction in 
Israel's domestic political scene. As soon as the October War had 
ended, vicious political bickering broke out between the rival right 
juid left wing factions of the ruling Labor Party, which left the Meir 
government with bajrely enough support in the Knesset to continue 
governing the country. In March of 197^ an investigation assessing 
the responsibility for the failure of Israeli intelligence in the 
early stages of the Yom Kipper War resulted in the collaspe of the 
Meir government and the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. 
The Rabin government replaced the Meir government, but it enjoyed no 
more than a two vote majority in the Knesset, so it was forced to 
negotiate with the Arabs while struggling for suirvival at home. 
The Arabs, on the other hand, found themselves in the most 
advantageous position that they had ever held against Israel. The 
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Efl^yptians and Syrians had proven on the battlefield that the Arabs 
were no longer a military force that could be dismissed, and by doing 
so they had won a great psychological victory in the conflict (while 
Israel suffered a large psychological defeat). The Arab successes on 
the battlefield led to a new Arab unity, causing Israel to be faced 
with a united Arab front at the negotiating table* Finally, the 
Arab oil embargo following the war caused oil prices to skyrocket, 
bringing immense wealth to oil rich Arab nations and transforming them 
immediately into major political powers on the international scene. 
The Middle East political situation at the time of the Sinai suid 
Golan Heights disengagement agreements, then, showed a complete re­
versal of the situation which existed prior to the October War, It 
was the Israelis who were lacking confidence, politically divided, 
and fighting among themselves, while the Arabs appeared united and 
confident of victory. The Arab states continued to press a hard line 
policy concerning boundary locations, though, curiously enough, the 
sudden assumption of power by the Arabs led to a more conciliatory 
rather than a more hostile attitude towards Israe, The Sinai and 
Golan Heights disengagement agreements were not marked by any major 
concessions by either side, but they did mark the first time that 
either Egypt or Syria had signed any agreement with Israel other than 
a cease fire accord. Also, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and 
Syria's President Assad expressed positive views toward such subjects 
as a signed peace agreement with Israel, demilitarized zones within 
their own countires, and anus limitation agreements, all of which had 
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been taboo i>rior to the 1973 War,^ At this time, though, the Arabs 
held the upper hand in the negotiations, and they appeared confident 
that Israel would be forced to give back all of the occupied territory. 
Consequently, they could afford to offer more concessions on periph­
eral issues, since a return of all the occupied territory would con­
stitute a major diplomatic victory for the Arabs, 
Altho\igh the Arabs held the upper hand in 197^» Israel realized 
that the united Arab fron rested on a very precarious foundation. 
Vast differences existed between the Arab states in terms of wealth, 
political ideology, military strength, and economic potential, and 
many Arab states held long standing rivalries, disputes and outright 
conflicts with other Arab nations. These basic conflicts among the 
Arab states led to a gradual disintegration of Arab unity and an 
eroding of the advantageous negotiating position enjoyed by the Arabs, 
From 1975 on both Israel and many of its primary Arab opponents suf­
fered through extended periods of internal (and in some cases external) 
political crisis, while clear-cut Israeli military superiority pro­
vided the stabilizing factor for maintaining an uneasy peace during 
the period. 
Two major changes affecting the dispute took place in 1977» The 
first was the election of Henachem Begin as Israel's prime minister 
in June, suid the second was Anwar Sadat's i)eace initiative in 
^Assad's comments on these subjects are in Time, 3 February 1975» 
p, 39* and Newsweek. 3 March 1975# P, 3^» while Sadat's views are 
expressed in Time, 3 February 1975» PP, 38"39, Time, 14 April 1975» 
p. 37» and the New York Times. 12 February 1975» P» 3» 
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November, The election of Begin changed considerably the Israeli 
negotiating position. Begin switched the major territorial emphasis 
to the West Bank (instead of the Golan Heights and Sinai), and in 
geneiral advanced a much more hard line bargaining position. The 
Sadat trip to Jerusalem served as a draj#atic announcement of Egypt's 
recognition of Israel as a Middle East nation, though Saidat did not 
moderate his peace proposals at that time. 
The Camp David summit of September 1978 led to a major break­
through in the Egypt-Israel dispute, as well as agreement by Sadat 
eind Begin upon a firework for Middle East peace. Since this "frame­
work" has not been accepted by any other Middle East nation (or the 
PLO), the future of this Middle East peace airrangement remains in 
doubt. The substance of the Camp David peace framework and the 
likelihood of its being accepted are discussed at length in the 
West Bank/Caza Strip negotiations section in this chapter, as well 
as in Chapter V, 
Negotiating Positions 
Sinai 
The arrangements agreed upon at the Camp David summit and sub­
sequent events in Israel virtually have resolved the Sinai question. 
The essence of the agreement is that Israel will return the entire 
Sinai to Egyptiait sovereignty and remove all military forces and 
civilian settlements in return for Sadat's acceptance of full normal­
ization of relations between E^pt and Israel, This normalization 
of relations means full diplomatic relations between Israel and E^pt 
78 
auid no economic boycotts or barriers to free movement of goods ajnd 
people between the two nations. The details of this agreement are 
included in Chapter V, 
It should be realized that many of the "concessions" of the 
Camp David summit represent very little compromise in previous po­
sitions, since El^pt and Israel had been quite close to agreement in 
the past over the issues separating them in the Sinai, In December 
of 1977 Prime Minister Begin announced acceptance of E^gyptian sov­
ereignty over the entire Sinai, though he insisted that Israeli troops 
would remain in a security corridor region along the p3:e-1967 War 
boundary and that the Israeli civilian settlements would remain in 
2 place. President Sadat had accepted the concept of normalization of 
relations between Egypt auid Israel as early as i975» though he in­
sisted that this development would take place only after a compre­
hensive Middle East peace treaty had been signed. Also, Sadat had 
agreed to limiting Egyptian forces in the Sinai and creating demil­
itarized zones, though he had asked for a reciprocal demilitarized 
zone on the Israeli side (which is part of the agreement),^ Finally, 
it was generally acknowledged that the United States would pay for 
relocation of the Israeli's strategic Sinai air fields in the event 
of a settlement between Egypt and Israel^(President Carter has agreed 
to finance relocation of Israel's Sinai airfields). The Israeli 
^New York Times. 17 December 1977# P. 1» 
^New York Times. 12 February 1975* P» 3* 
^Time. 13 February 1978* P» ^5. 
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withdrawal of its armed forces from the Sinai is a concession Israel 
had not 845i«ed to in the past, but the 20 to 40 kilometer wide 
demilitarized zone (occupied by United Nations forces) lying west of 
the international boundary and the Gulf of Aquaba accomplishes the 
same purpose as a security corridor, so Israel, in effect, gains its 
objective. 
Since so many of the details of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
were already close to being resolved, the agreement was reached by 
a trade off of one major Israeli concession for two Egyptian ones. 
Basically, Prime Minister Begin agreed to remove completely the 
Israeli presence in the Sinai (both military and civilian) in retura 
for President Sadat's acceptance of full diplomatic relations with 
Israel and agreement to an overall peace framework which called for 
recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and 
their just requirements," rather than a specific declaration of 
Palestinian rights to self determination (which Sadat haul insisted 
ujwn in the past). 
The Camp David agreement indicates the extent of the emphasis 
shift between the Begin government and the previous Labor fturty 
governments. The labor governments since 19^7 tended to place con­
siderable emphasis upon retaining an Israeli presence in portions 
of the Sinai territory. All of the Labor governments adopted a policy 
of retaining direct Israeli control (either through annexation or 
some kind of leasing arrangement) over the corridor of land running 
along the Gulf of Aquaba to Sharm el Sheihk. The Rabin government 
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took the initiative in pusbin#^ Israeli consolidation actions in the 
Rafiah Salient area following the 1973 War, and it also sponsored 
much of the oil exploration in the Sinai, agricultural development 
in the Rafiah Salient, and the /gradual relocation of Beudoin from 
the El Arlsh area. Althou^arh Be^in Initially adopted a policy of 
retaininpc the Sinai settlements and retaining an Israeli military 
presence in the Sinai, obviously Begin believed that the West Bank 
was far more important to Israel than any part of the Sinai, 
Another reason for Begin being willing to give up the entire 
Sinai, though, is that he realized that the Egyptiaun offer to norm­
alize relations was too important to pass up, A separate peace with 
E^ypt is vitally Important for Israel, because it gives Israel a 
level of security it has never experienced before. Without Egyptian 
troops, the Arab opponents of Israel currently axe in no position to 
pose much of a military threat to Israel. In addition to giving 
Israel unprecedented security, it also leaves Israel in a most ad­
vantageous position in any future Middle East peace negotiations. 
The advantages Israel gains by Egypt's defection from the united Arab 
front are discussed later in this chapter. 
West Bank/Oaza Strip 
Since the Hest Bank and Caza Strip territories are the focal 
point of the Palestinian issue, they will be discussed jointly. In 
these two territories, the negotiating positions of the opposing sides 
are considerably at odds. The basic belief of Rrime Minister Begin 
concerning these territories is that they are Israeli territory and 
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that they belon;:^ to the Jewish people. Since there are other claims 
to the territory, however, the question of sovereignty should be left 
open at present. Prior to the Camp David summit. Prime Minister 
Befrin's proposals included* (i) Israeli military control over the 
territory, (2) eventual Palestinian civilian control over Palestinian 
Arabs in the teirritories, and (3) no Palestinian state,^ The Arabs 
have countered with a basic demand for complete Israeli withdrawal 
(military and civilian) and self determination for the Palestinian 
people. 
The Arab position in the West fiank is somewhat complicated 
because it is not entirely clear how the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Arabs are )!?oin;^ to be represented in negotiations. Since the 197^ 
Arab summit conference, the Palestine Liberation Organization has 
been designated as the only legitimate representative of the Pales­
tinian i)eople in peace negotiations. The PLO's public position for 
some time has been as follows 1 (l) all Palestine belongs to the 
Palestinian Arabs, (2) the PLO will accept nothing less than the 
destruction of the Jewish state, and (3) Palestine will be governed 
by a secular Arab government under which Jews will be permitted to 
reiaain. Privately, it appears that the PLO is resigned to an Israeli 
state in the Middle East, but will insist upon nothing less than com­
plete Israeli withdrawal from the territories suid the formation of 
^Newsweek, I6 January 1978, p, 40, 
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a Palestinian state.^ In general» Israeli governments have attempted 
to negotiate the Palestinian issue with Jordam. King Hussein of 
Jordan maintains a public position of demanding Israeli withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with the final disposition of 
the territory to be worked out between Hussein and the Palestinisms. 
The agreements reached at Camp David changed the direction of 
peace negotiations* though it did not change markedly the Israeli 
position. Basically, the Middle East peace framework worked out 
at Caunp David was am effort to resolve the West Bjuik and Gaza. Strip 
issues by ciircumventing the PLO. The major points of the framework 
are as followsi (i) Israeli military government and civilian admin­
istration will be replaced by a self governing authority elected by 
the inhabitants of the two territories, (2) Egypt, Israel and Jordan 
will agree on the modality for establishing the elected self-governing 
authority in the two territories, (3) ftilestinians from within the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip (or other Palestinians as mutually agreed 
upon) will be allowed as members of Egypt's or Jordan's delegation 
to negotiations, (4) Parties to the negotiations will define the 
powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority, 
(5) A withdrawal of Israeli forces will take place and the remaining 
Israeli forces will be redeployed into specific security locations. 
(6) Security arrangements will be negotiated by the parties, though 
a strong local police force (which could include Jordanian citizens) 
would be created. (?) Once the self-governing council is established, 
^Leon Wieseltier, "Interview with General Peled," New York Review 
of Books, 23 Februairy 1978, p. 17. Peled (a retired Israeli Major Gen­
eral) has had numerous unofficial contacts with the PLO. 
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a 5 year transition period will "begin. Not later than 3 years after 
the beginning of this transition period, negotiations Kould take 
place to determine the final status of these two territories and 
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. This final agree­
ment is supposed to recognize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and their just requirements,"'^ 
It is apparent that Israel has made few concessions on the West 
Bank and Gaza. Strip issue. Begin did agree to remove some of the 
Israeli troops, "but the agreement contains no provisions insuring 
eventual Israeli military withdrawal from the territories, it says 
nothing about Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
and it contains no guarantees of eventual Palestinian self determination. 
In fact. Prime Minister Begin stated that he intended to press Israel's 
claims to the territory in the negotiations for final resolution of 
O 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, It is apparent, then, that Prime 
Minister Begin views the firamework as a means of resolving the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip issue without the PLO, and also a meaJis of pre­
venting the formation of a separate Palestinian state. 
The issue which lies at the heart of the West Bsmk and Gaza 
Strip problem (in fact which is the core problem of the entiire Middle 
Bast dispute) is the question of Palestinian self determination. It 
has been noted previously that the entire history of Mandated Pales­
tine was little more than a continuous struggle between Jews and 
"^The Washington Post, 19 September 1978, p. l6, contains a text 
of the Middle East peace framework. 
^Ibid. 
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Palestinian Arabs over ultijnate sovereignty in the eurea. The 19^8 
United Nations solution to the problem recognized both sides* 
claims to sovereignty by creating separate nations, a solution which 
was acceptable to the Jews at the time. Then it was the Arabs who 
refused to acknowledge Israel's claims to sovereignty, forcing Israel 
to fight an intermittent 30 years war before Arab states began accept­
ing Israel's claims. Now, ironically enough, it is the Israeli's 
intransigence which suppresses the Palestinians' desire for self 
determination, and which threatens to destrx)y current possibilities 
for a Middle East peace settlement. 
It roust be recognized that, to a considerable extent, the Begin 
government's opposition to a Palestinian state is as much a matter of 
strategy as principle. If the Israeli government accepts the concept 
of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories, 
then something is going to have to be done about the settlements in 
these territories, particularly the West Bank, Under any kind of 
Palestinian self determination arrangement, Israel has three choices 
of what it can do with the settlementsi (l) press for annexation of 
as much Israeli-populated West Bank territory as possible, (2) leave 
the settlers subject to a Palestinian government, or (3) evacuate the 
settlements. The political consequences resulting from any of these 
choices would create serious problems for Israel, If Israel adopts a 
policy of annexation, it would have to take much of the West Bank 
territory along with it. This policy would outrage the Palestinians, 
require inclusion of a large Arab population within Israel's borders, 
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and would provide embarassing proof of the Arabs* charge that Israel 
is an expansionist state. Leaving the settlements in place, but 
under Palestiniam sovereignty, is not a viable alternative for Begin 
either. One could expect the P&,3.estinian government simply to taJce 
whatever steps were necessary to convince Israeli settlers to move 
back to Israel (these could range from administrative harassment to 
outright violence, depending upon the determination of the Israeli 
settlers to remain). Outright evacuation of the settlements would 
mean repudiation of Begin*s (and the Likud Party's) concept of re­
establishing Biblical Israel, The reason for Begin's stirong oppo­
sition to the Palestinian self determination concept, then, is quite 
obviousJ there is no way that Begin's call for restoration of Biblical 
Israel can be reconciled with Palestinian self determination. 
Under the Camp David arrangment, though, Begin not only avoids 
all of these problems, but he opens the door for accomplishing his 
long desired dream of making the Judea and Samaria regions a part of 
Israel once again. It must be realized that the Camp David framework 
neither limits Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank area nor 
contains any specific guarantee of P&,lestinian self determination. 
Prime Minister Begin has insisted that his agreement with President 
Caorter to freeze further West Bank settlement activity applies only 
to the ijeriod prior to completion of Egypt-Israel i>eace negotiations, 
not through the establishment of the Palestinian self governing body, 
as President Carter claims. Further, Begin*s statement that he 
intended to press Israel's claim to the territories during the 
86 
negotiations concerning final disposal of the two territories in­
dicates his intention of gaining Israeli control over or at least 
unlimited Israeli access to these territories. Prime Minister 
Begin*8 earlier peace proposals contained demands which would guarantee 
the rights of Israeli citissens to settle in the regions of Judea and 
Samaria.^ One can expect Begin to insist ui)on this demand during the 
preliminary negotiations forming the interim Palestinian governing 
body. It is doubtful that Israel would be willing to grant the 
Palestinian governing body authority to limit Israeli land purchase 
and settlement in the West Bank area (unless extreme pressure were 
brought to bear on the Israelis*), As long as Israelis* were permitted 
to purchase West Baiik territory, the Palestinians could do little to 
prevent the more affluent Israelis* from moving into the West Bank 
and buying up Arab land, thus furthering the Israeli encroachment. 
The Israeli absorption of much of the West Bank could be accomplished 
through economic means, then, without having to worry about the com­
plications caused by outright annexation. 
The Camp David agreement fails to resolve the issue of Palestinian 
representation at the peace talks. Under the Camp David format, 
Palestinians are permitted in the preliminary negotiations, but only 
Palestinians living within the two territories can join in the talks 
without prior Israeli approval. This arrangement effectively eliminates 
the PLO since Israel would veto their participation, should the PLO 
decide to seek representation of the Palestinians under the cvirrent 
^Newsweek, l6 January 1978, p, ̂ 0, 
87 
arranffement. Yet it is )a:oing to be extremely difficult to resolve 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip problems without including the PLO, 
The vast majority of West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs are not active 
PLO members, but the majority of these Arabs appear to accept the 
PLO as their sole representative in any negotiations with Israel, 
Consequently, any Israeli effort to circumvent the PLO is not going 
to be acceptable to West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs, even if the newly 
elected Arab spokesmen are more representative of prevailing Arab 
political views in these territories than the PLO is. 
It is obvious from the framework agreed upon at Gamp David that 
Israel wanted to resolve the West Bajik issue by negotiating with 
Jordan (which President Sadat appeairs to desire as well, given his 
recent falling out with the PLO), It is generally accepted that 
King Hussein of Jordan would prefer regaining some sort of control 
over the West Bank, but he has balked at entering the negotiations, 
because he could not gain sufficient Israeli concessions to placate 
Palestinian interests. King Hussein would have to gain nothing less 
than complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza, Strip and 
East Jerusalem before he could gain limited acceptance of a return to 
Jordaniaoi control. His only alternative would be to make an attempt 
at gaining self determination for the I^lestinians, thus attempting to 
accomodate the Palestinian interests by achieving what the PIX) would 
have little chance of accomplishing. This possibility is discussed 
at length in Chapter V, 
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Israel's negotiating strategy should be rather clear by now. 
The key element is gaining the separate peace with Egypt, thus split­
ting the Arab unity and reducing the Arab militaiy threat to oanagable 
porportions. Once an agreement has been reached with Egypt, then 
Syria, Jordan and the PIX) no longer represent a viable military 
threat to Iszrael. In this situation, Israel can continue uninter­
rupted its current West Bank and Gaza Strip i)olicy and extend the 
policy of an imposed settlement to the Golan Heights amd Jerusalem 
issues. Simply put, without Egypt, the Arabs currently are not in a 
very good position to gain anything more than the minimal concessions 
from Israel, 
Golgm Heights 
It has been demonstrated previously that Israeli policy in the 
Golan Heights has stopped just short of annexation, so it would not 
be particularly difficult for Israel to take the integration and 
consolidation actions one step farther. In general, the Golan Heights 
policy adopted by Israeli governments prior to Begin's administration 
was one of near total annexation of the area, with the possibility 
of minor concessions being made in the farthest reaches of the eurea. 
No specific details of Prime Minister Begin's Golan Heights policy 
have been made public, though Begin has indicated that the Golan 
Heights territory is not the major concern to him that it was to pre­
vious Israeli administrations. It is very possible that Syria could 
gain more concessions from the Begin administration than from previous 
Israeli governments, though it is doubtful that Begin's concessions 
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Hould even come close to the Syrian demand for total Israeli with­
drawal. With Egypt out of the picture, though, Israel is under no 
real pressure to negotiate with Syria, More than likely, little if 
any progress would be nade on the Golan Heights issue, but Israel 
could prolong the negotiations indefinitely, so lack of progress in 
the negotiations would not be a major cause for concern, 
Jerusalem Negotiations 
In the Jerusalem issue considerable differences exist between 
the negotiating positions of the two sides. The Israelis'' have 
already annexed extensive Arab territory in the area and insist that 
the city must remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. The Arabs 
counter by demanding total Israeli withdrawal from the annexed Arab 
territory. The only concession maide by either side up to this point 
has been the Israeli efforts taken to grant a degree of autonomy to 
Arab holy places in East Jerusalem, The Israelis argue that their 
annexation is legitimate and proper becausei (l) the primary Arab 
concern in the area (the right to worship at the Dome of the Rock) 
is accomodated, and (2) the refusal of Arabs to enter Israel to wor­
ship at Arab shrines in East Jerusalem is a clear statement of the 
Arab nations* refusal to accept Israel as a Middle East state, so 
continued Isiraeli control of a unified Jerusalem is necessary to insure 
that Jews would not be denied access to Jewish holy places in the 
East Jerusalem area. The Jerusalem issue is so complicated, and so 
many different arrangements have been offered as possible solutions, 
that the discussion of the various possibilities will be included with 
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the Jerusalem discussion in the followins; chapter. 
Conclusions 
The entire Israeli neerotiatinp stratejcy is dependent upon ^et-
tin/? E(?ypt out of the conflict, though there are ̂ j:ood reasons for 
Israel's bankinp: so heavily ujjon this possibility. It must be realized 
that Eteypt is the Arab nation which would benefit the most from a 
peace settlement. The Egyptian economy was on the verge of collaspe 
before the 1973 War, and the situation has not improved much followinf? 
the conflict. President Sadat was extremely bitter over Saudia 
Arabia's willingness to provide money to finance the Egyptian military 
venture a^ianst Israel, while refusin^sr to provide E^ypt with adequate 
financial investment for desperately needed industrial development. 
As Sadat correctly pointed out, it was the Egyptian lives lost in the 
October War which made it possible for the price of oil to quadruple, 
crivin^ Saudia Arabia immense wealth,Yet, Saudia Arabia does not 
want an economically healthy Ep:ypt challenging them for leadership 
in the Arab world, so the Saudis limit their financial assistance to 
keepint^ E^^ypt afloat and nothing more, Sadat has mana^^ed to attract 
capital from other sources, but his economy is still on the brink of 
disaster. By November of 1977 Ejarypt was so deeply in debt (over 12 
billion) that outside banking interests (primarily the World Bank) 
made it clear to Sadat that he would have to cut defense spending 
(25 percent of GNP) and place revenue in productive areas or face cut 
^^Alvin Z, Rubenstein, "Egypt Since the October War," Current 
History 70 (January 1976)t 17. 
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off of funds. Also, Epypt was unable to pay the k billion it owed to 
the Soviet Union for military hardware, so the Soviet Union cut off 
Efljypt's supply of spare parts, leavin^^ Egypt virtually powerless even 
to defend itself. Consequently, Sadat had to seek some sort of si^ree-
ment with Israel simply as a matter of survival. 
It is these economic problems of Eprypt which ̂ ive Prime Minister 
Beffin confidence that his hard line policy can succeed. It is obvious 
that the rewaa?ds of such a policy can be s^reat for Israel, Certainly, 
Be^rin appears to have pressured Sadat to accept a separate peace, 
while thwarting Palestinian demands for self determination. If Be^in 
A 
continues to outmaneuver the Arabs, Israel can retain control of 
(or at a minimum, access to) much of the territory it values, maintain 
military forces in most of the imi»rtant security areas, and retain 
control of a unified Jerusalem, It is easy to understand why Israel 
would adopt this nep:otiatin^^ stratep:y, but it should be realized that 
the consequences of it very possibly could be far pireater than is 
immediately evident. 
The major problem with Israel's stratepcy is that it places too 
much reliance upon Egypt's remaininp: out of any future Middle East 
conflict between Israel and the Arabs. The chances of keeping? E^jypt 
out of future conflicts are not too favorable. One of the difficulties 
with the Israeli strate<?y is that it asks President Sadat to forfeit 
much of the prestipje he has built up in the Arab world. If Sgidat 
makes a separate peace agreement with Israel without gaining any re­
ciprocal Israeli agreement to recognize the Palestinian right of self 
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determination, to accept the principle of withdrawal from Arab ter­
ritory, and to acknowledge that different arrangements need to be 
worked out concerninp: Jerusalem, then Sadat would be re^rarded as a 
traitor by much of the Arab world. Stripped of support within the 
Arab world and greatly diminished in stature both at home and abroad, 
Sadat would stand little chance of survivin^jf for very lon<?. It must 
be realized, then, that the precarious state of the Egyptian economy 
is a double-ed^ed sworti. Certainly, Israel can extract concessions 
from President Sadat, f?iven his present predicament, but if it goes 
too far it risks the possibility of Sadat bein^ deposed and replaced 
by a hard line faction. This possibility is particularly acute, given 
the economic situation in Egypt, Sadat's efforts to shore up the 
Egyptian economy early in 1977 by cutting government subsidies led to 
extensive rioting in Cario, which gives a good indication of just 
how tenuous President Sadat's hold on the government is. It is ex­
tremely unlikely that Sadat could remain In power for very long if 
he caved in to the Israeli demands, eind it is doubtful that whoever 
replaced hire would continue his moderate policies. In times of severe 
economic depression, one of the easiest means of dealing with the pro­
blem is finding a scapegoat upon which a skillful government can direct 
the hostility and frustration of the citizens. In this case, Israel 
would be the: perfect target. 
Another major problem of the Israeli policy is that it assumes 
that Israel can continue its present policy without suffering any undue 
domestic consequences. Since the 1973 War a number of signs have 
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surfaced which indicate that Israel is sufferin^^ severe consequences 
on the home front because of its policy. In the first place the huge 
demand for American arms required to continue a hard line policy has 
had a drastic effect upon the Israeli balance of payments, Israel's 
current balance of payments defecit is about 10 billion dollars, and 
it continues to mount because of a defense budget which consimes 32 
11 
percent of GNP, This deficit has led to several currency devalu­
ations and major tax increases while causing: inflation to skyrocket 
1 ? 
(estimated at 50 percent for this year). The net effect of all this 
is a drastic reduction in purchasinj^ power of the average Israeli 
citizen, as well as a corresponding decline in living standards. The 
nation of Israel is feeling the effects of the economic squeeze and 
psychological strain caused by living under the constant threat of 
war, Jews are leaving Israel in incireasing numbers, and many potential 
immigrants are choosing to live elsewhere (in 1976 almost 50 percent 
13 
of Soviet Jews leaving Russia chose to live elsewhere). Between 
1973 and 197^ alone, immigration to Israel decreased by 42 percent 
(32,000 versus 55»000), and by 1976 emigration exceeded immigration 
(20,000 to 18,600),^^ If this situation continues, coupled with pre­
vailing Jewish and Arab birth rates, Arabs might well outnumber Jews 
^^Guido Goldman, "Why Israel Should Settle Now," New York Review 




Elizabeth Monroe, "The West Banki Palestinian or Israeli?," 
The Middle East Journal 31 (Autumn 1977)« 400, 
^^Ibid. 
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within Israel proper by the tuim of the century. It is clearly evi­
dent f then, that the hard line policy is extracting an inmense toll 
uixjn Israel's donestic well bein^. 
The final problem with Israel's current policy is that even if 
Israel gains everything!: it wants, there is no reason to believe that 
this solution would ftuarantee Israeli security in the Middle East, It 
has already been demonstrated what the likely consequences of Israeli 
policy would be in Ep^pt, and one could expect a similar reaction 
throughout the Arab world. The complete frustration of Arab diplomatic 
objectives would most likely lead to a recommitment to the Arab policy 
of wiping Israel off the Middle East map* rather tham the Arab's 
grudging acceptance of and gradual normalization of relations with 
Israel, 
The gravest consequences could result from the suppression of 
Flalestinian nationalist ambitions and the encroachment ui)on Arab lands 
in the West Bank, Frustrated in gaining their objectives in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinians might turn elsewhere to establish 
a base of operations, particularly Jordan and Lebanaon, The possi­
bility for Palestinian takeover of Lebanon has already been discussed 
in Chapter II, and the potential for this takeover occurring would be 
far greater if none of the Palestinian demands are satisfied by Israel, 
Syria is virtually in control of Lebanon now, so if Syria decided to 
support the PLO-Lebanese Muslim coalition against the Lebanese 
Christians (which would be very likely if Israel shows no interest 
in making major concessions in the Golan Heights), then Israel would 
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have to enter the war on the side of the Lebanese Christians to pre­
vent a PLO-Lebanese Muslim takeover of the country. 
The situation is Jordan also presents a great problem for 
Israel's current policy. The basic problem is that Jordan is a house 
divided. Most of Jordan's problems are a direct result of the annex­
ation of the West Bank territory following the 19^8-49 Arab-Israel War, 
At the time the area provided Jordan with substantial economic benefits 
from increased agricultural production and an extensive increase in 
tourism. Yet Jordan gained far more problems than benefits from its 
annexation action. One of the most serious drawbacks of the action 
was that it earned Jordan the permanent enmity of many Arab nations, 
because it demonstrated that Jord?in used the 19^-^9 War to its own 
advantage at the expense of its Arab neighbors. While other Arab 
nations involved in the war were intent upon defeating the Jews and 
returning Palestine to Palestinian Arab control, Jordan was concen­
trating upon grabbing as much of Palestine as possible. The second 
major drawback of the annexation action was that it created severe 
domestic conflicts within the country, for overnight Jordan became 
a nation in which over half the population was a foreign nationality 
(Palestinian), The Palestinians were, by and large, a far more educated 
and sophisticated people than the provincial, nomadic Heshemites of 
Jordsm, so the Palestinians quickly developed a strong resentment to 
being governed under the Jordanian monarnhlal system, while the 
Hashemites resented the rapid incorporation of the more educated 
Palestinians into high administrative positions within the Jordanian 
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government, Jordan's problems in assimilating Palestinians became 
even more acute followin^^ the Six Day War. Over 225i000 fled to the 
East Bank (Jordan proper) durin/;^ the war, and by 1973 the Palestinians 
made up more than kO percent of the population of Jordan proper. 
It is this massive presence of Palestinians alon^ with Jordain's 
basic isolationist position in the Middle East which so complicates 
the Jordanian situation. Given the lar^re numbers of Palestinians in 
Jordan, the PLO can force King Hussein to adopt a fair more ag^essive 
policy a^rainst Israel or risk civil war within his own country. The 
former situation could involve Israel directly in a war (or at least 
extensive guerrilla action), while the latter situation would require 
direct Israeli intervention to preserve Hashemite control in Jordaui, 
The suppression of Palestinian nationalism, then, merely replaces one 
problem with another potentially lar^rer one. In fact, it is very 
possible that Israel would find itself facing, once again, enemies on 
three sides who would be eager to continue the fight against Israel 
(the front could expand to four sides, should a hard line group come 
to power in E^pt), 
The likely result of Israeli diplomatic success, then, would be 
the placing of Israel under a permanent state of siege. It is imma­
terial whether or not the Arab forces could defeat Israel on the 
battlefield; they could cause immense casualties for Israel certainly, 
and foirce Israel to face the realization that they would have little 
hope of avoiding a continuous succession of costly armed conflicts 
with Arab neighbors. Israel would gain no more security than it had 
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before the 19^7 War, and the Middle East political situation would 
remain as unstable as ever. It seems that the time has come for 
Israel to make a genuine effort to resolve its differences with the 
Arab nations. The arrangements of such a peace settlement and the 
meajis for achieving it are discussed In the following chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 
The precedinj? chapters have ^iven some indication of the magni­
tude of the task involved in resolving the Middle East conflict. The 
Israeli's and the Arabs are still bitterly divided over many of the 
basic issues of the conflict. None of the parties involved have good 
reason to place much trust in the words of the opposition, and in fact 
can have little confidence in the strength of the commitment of their 
own allies. Finally* the Israelis have little reason to believe that 
the centuries old Arab commitment to the Jihad will die a quick death, 
nor can the Arabs accept any assurances that Israel is not becoming an 
exi>ansionist state, intent upon swallowing up much of the West Bank and 
Golan Heights, 
Still, considerable progress has been made. Certainly Egypt 
appears willing to accept Israel as a Middle East nation, Jordan appears 
to be seeking an acceptable means of accomodation with Israel (rather 
than confrontation), while even Syria auid Saudia Arabia are showing 
signs of resigning themselves to a Jewish state in the Arab Middle 
East, President Sadat's suprise journey to Jerusalem in November of 
1977 and Prime Minister Benin's return trup to Gario shattered the 
traditional Arab Insistence upon no face to face negotiations, and 
provided a clear signal that Egypt was abandoning a military solution 
to the Middle East problem. The 1978 Camp David agreement confirmed 
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this Ep:yptian policy, setting? the sta^e for a separate x>eace treaty 
to be neffotiated between Egypt and Israel, 
Sinai 
The final details of the separate peace are still beinf^ worked 
out, though the preliminary agreement reached at Ceubp David resolved 
most of the basic issues. The major points of the agreement are as 
follows. In the area of relations between Egypt and Israel, both 
sides agree to (l) full recognition, (2) abolish economic boycotts, 
(3) guarantee that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
nation shall enjoy the protection of due process of law, (4) explore 
the possibilities of joint economic development, and (5) consider the 
possibility of establishing claims commissions. 
The teiritorial aspects of the agreement provide for the follow­
ing! (1) return of the entire Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, (2) 
withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from the Sinai, (3) the use 
of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafan, Ras en Njuil 
and Sham el Sheihk for civilian purposes only, including possible 
commercial use by all nations, (4) the right of free passage by ships 
of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, with the Straits 
of Tiran and Gulf of Aquaba being recognized as international wateir-
ways for freedom of navigation and overflight by all nations, and (5) 
the construction of a hiprhway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat 
with guaranteed free and peaceful use by Egypt and Jordan. 
The following military arrangements are agreed to in the pacts 
(1) no more than one division (mechanized or Infantry) of Egyptian 
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armed forces will be stationed within an area lyinp: approximately 50 
kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, (2) only UN forces 
and civilian police equiped with light weapons will be stationed within 
an area lyini^ west of the international border and Gulf of Aquaba 
varyin^i^ in width from 20 kilometers to 40 kilometers, (3) in the area 
3 kilometers east of the international boundary, Israeli forces will 
be limited to k infantry battalions and UN observers, (4) border pa­
trol units not to exceed 3 battalions will supplement the civil police 
in maintaining order in the Sinai area not mentioned above, and (5) 
UN forces will be stationed in parts of the area in the Sinai lyin^^ 
within about 20 kilometers of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to 
the international boundary, and in the Sharm el Sheihk area,^ The 
precise location of the boundary lines for these particular demil­
itarized zones is to be worked out at the final peace talks, 
West Bank and Gaza Strip 
This Camp David afl^reement also outlined a framework for an over­
all Middle East peace, paying particular attention to the West Bank 
issue. In the previous chapter it was noted that this West Bank 
aigreement allowed Prime Minister Begin the possibility of realizing 
most of his territorial aunbitions. The agreement did not guarantee 
Palestinian self determination, it did not require Israeli evacuation 
of settlements, withdrawal from the territory, or even eventual Israeli 
removal of all military forces. By merely providing for negotiation 
^See The Washington Post. 19 September 1978, p, I6, for a text 
of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt, 
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of these issues, it allowed Prime Minister Be^in several avenues for 
pursuing Israeli ambitions in the territory. Under the Camp David 
arrangment, Be(^in can press for continued Israeli control over the 
territory through a confederation with Israel, he can seek annexation 
of West Bank territory heavily settled by Israelis, or he can adopt 
a strategy of granting autonomy to West Bank Arabs while maintaining 
Israeli military forces in strategic locations and insuring Israeli 
takeover of desired West Bank areas through a policy of open migration 
of people (both Arab and Israeli) throughout all of the Palestine area. 
All of these policies would allow Prime Minister Begin to continue 
Israeli control over most West Bank areas in which Israel has shown 
an interest. Without the threat of Egyptian military forces, the 
Palestinians and Jordan would not be in a position to force many con­
cessions from the Israelis, In short, the Camp David agreement leaves 
Israel in an excellent position to accomplish its ends. 
The Camp David arrangements pose potentially serious consequences 
for the Arab side, since the agreement precluded other alternative 
methods of resolving the conflict. In the past most efforts for re­
solving the conflict concentrated upon a unified approach, one in 
which all i>arties to the conflict would meet at a single location and 
work out an agreement. Although a unified approach (such as the 
proposed Geneva convention arrangement) appeared to be most advanta­
geous to the Arab side, Sadat's peace initiative has circumvented any 
possibility for a Geneva convention, Apiarently Sadat realized that the 
unified Arab representation at a Geneva convention approach would be 
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detrimental to achievinsr any peace settlement, because the moderate 
Arab nations would be too restricted in their actions by the hard line 
block (PLO and Syria, backed by the Soviet Union) to allow for any 
2 
proffress to be made. President Sadat decided to go it alone, appar­
ently, because he needed a settlement, and he knew that his chances 
of ^ettin^ one would be better if he negotiated separately. 
Initially, President Sadat's method circumvented the hard line 
elements by asking Israel merely to commit itself to a principle of 
withdrawal and the principle of Palestinian self determination, with 
the details of such an arranpjement beinpj worked out by the individual 
states or political entities immediately involved. At Camp David 
Sadat compromised his earlier approach and accepted the Israeli 
statement that the overall peace settlement must recognize "the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements," 
rather than hold out for a straightforward Israeli statement accept­
ing Palestinian self determination. Since Egypt and Israel are on the 
verge of concluding a peace treaty, it appears that there will be no 
Geneva conference, no unified Arab front to face Israel in Middle East 
negotiations. Whether they like it or not, the Arab nations are going 
to have to conduct future negotiations with Israel within the frame­
work outlined in the Camp David agreement, or risk the possibility of 
Israel merely imposing the settlement it wants in the West Bank should 
the Arabs refuse to go along with the Camp David framework, 
2 
This is essentially the argujs<»nt offered by Robert Tucker in "The 
Middle Easti For a Separate Peace, " Coanientaiy, March 1978» PP» 25~31» 
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It has already been noted that the framework agreed ujjon at Caap 
David provide;? ar arranfrement within which Israel can accomplish most 
of its objectives. Since this framework is likely to be the arrange­
ment within which any negotiations take place, it is essential to 
take a closer look at it to see what it holds for possibilities of 
accomplishing Arab interests, particularly Palestinian interests in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
The central issue for the Palestinians is the question of self 
determination. On this issue the Camp David aj^reement, admittedly, 
is rather imprecise, for it merely affirms that the "legitimate rights 
of the Palestinian people and their just requirements" must be recofi^ 
nized in any peace settlement. Quite obviously, this statement caun 
mean different thin^^s to different people. The previous discussions 
in this thesis conceminp; the Palestinian question have indicated 
that Israel certainly can use this va^ue statement as a means of 
denying self determination to the Palestinians, Yet, there is another 
side to the statement. In an interview in January of 1978, Prime 
Minister Bef^in stated that he beHeved ttiat the West Bank eind Gaza 
Strip were Israeli territory, that these areas belonged to the Jewish 
people, but he acknowledged that there were other claims to the terri-
3 tory so the question of sovereignty should be left open. Although 
Begin did not mention the Palestinians by name, he, in fact, acknow­
ledged the historical identity of the Palestinian people, something 
which all previous Israeli governments were loath to do. This recog-
^Newsweek. 16 January 1978, p, 40, 
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nition that the Palestinians do have some claim over the West BaJik and 
Gaza Strip territories is the first step in accepting the riprht of 
Palestinian self determination. The Camp David a^^reement takes this 
pivital process several steps further. It specifically states that a 
Palestinian 'Voverninf? body" will "be elected to represent Palestinians 
in the final nepiotiations for resolution of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip question as well as be the "autonomous eiovemment" administering^ 
Plalestinian affairs in the two territories. 
Taken together, these developments represent a significant step 
in the direction of Palestinian self determination. Now that Israel 
has acknowledged the historical rights of the Palestinian people in 
Mandated Palestine, provided for an elected body to represent the 
Palestinians, and acknowledged that the Palestinians' "legitimate 
rights" and "just requirements" be recognized, it has set in motion 
an irreversible process, Israel might be able to stall off the 
Palestinian demaJids for awhile, but it is almost certain that the 
Israelis* intense desire for peace, coupled with the Palestinians* 
unrelenting demand for independence, would lead to the inevitable 
conclusion. Indeed, most of Prime Minister Begin*s own party members 
passionately opposed the Caunp David accords precisely because they 
believed that it would lead to a Palestinian state,^ 
Certainly, to proceed through the Camp David framework is a 
roundabout means for the Palestinians to accomplish their primary 
^The Knesset approval of the Camp David accords irreversibly 
commits Israel to this position. 
The Washington Post. 28 September 1978, p, 2^, 
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objective, but it mierht be the only politically feasible approach 
at the moment. If the Palestinians are to be successful in their 
quest for self determination, they are froinp^ to have to persuade the 
Israelis to accept this principle, Ris:ht now, persuasion of Israel 
is next to impossible. If Prime Minister Begin had returned from 
Camp David with a pact which recognized Palestinian self determination, 
he would have had no chance of gaining Knesset approval of it. With 
the Palestinian issues left to recognition of legitimate rights, though. 
Begin is free to offer his own interpretation of the agreement, claim­
ing as he does that Israel's settlements will remain in the West Bank, 
that Israeli forces will remain indefinitely in the West Bank, and that 
no Palestinian state is in the offering. Serene in the belief that 
Israel's policy can continue unabated, the Israeli citizen can bask 
in the euphoria of the Camp David accomplishments, while putting off 
the hard choices which must be made to finish the task at hand,^ 
Once the Israelis become convinced that peace is both achieveable and 
infinitely preferable to the state of siege which preceded it, one can 
expect Israel to become far more responsive to the Palestinians* 
demands for statehood. It is somewhat ironic that Israel, which 
gradually came into being because the language of the Balfour Dec­
laration was sufficiently vaigue to appease the Palestinian Arabs( 
^I, F, Stone argues that this is precisely one of the major 
advantages of the Camp David accords, that it allows the Israelis to 
deceive themselves about the extent of concessions that they will have 
to make, and that it forces the Israelis to get involved in a long, 
drawn out process, which, in the long run, favors the Palestinian hopes 
of self determination. See, I, F. Stone, "The Case for Camp David," 
The New York Review of Books. 26 October 1978, p, 11, 
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miiBiht well have set the stage for Palestinian statehood by afcreeing 
to the vaguely worded Camp David agreement of 1978. 
Since the Arabs stand to lose more by avoiding (rather than 
entering) the negotiating framework called for in the Camp David 
agreements, it would be to their advantage to become involved in the 
peace process. The Camp David framework calls for much of the West 
Bank negotiating burden to be borne by Jordan, so the pivotal figure 
in the future of Middle East peace is going to be King Hussein of 
Jordan, King Hussein should agree to enter the negotiations, but he 
should make it explicitly clear to President Caxter and the Israelis 
that Jordan will refuse to enter talks if Israel makes any efforts 
either to construct new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
or reinforce the settlements alreauiy in place. Once that this message 
is pointedly conveyed, Hussein can take steps to outmaneuver the PLO, 
King Hussein should make it clear to Yasir Arafat of the PLO that 
continued boycotting of the peace process risks losing large amounts 
of West Bank territory and plays into Israel's hands (an opinion that 
Hussein seems to hold). Therefore, Arafat can stay out of the talks 
and continue his hoi>eless efforts at a militaiy solution, or he can 
make an effort to negotiate with Israel, If Arafat does not want to 
seek nesrotiations with Israel, then King Hussein can infonn Arafat that 
Jordan will enter the talks with the single intention of gaining an 
independent Palestinian state. 
King Hussein can give Arafat the choice of going public with his 
counter proposals or having Hussein carry them to the Israelis in 
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private talks. Should Arafat decide to open up a diolop:ue with the 
Israelis, he does not have any choice but to give up the PLO drean 
of a liberated Palestine, In order even to be considered* Arafat 
would have to offer the followinia; concessionsi (l) acceptance of Israel 
as a Middle East nation, (2) affireement to normalization of relations 
between Israel and the P&,lestinian entity, (3) end terrorist activity, 
and ('4') make a genuine effort at peaceful coexistence. In turn Arafat 
could demand complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory 
of the West Bank, Caza Strip and East Jerusalem, and an Israeli guar­
antee of Palestinian self determination. The concessions for Arafat 
would be tremenduous, but anything less than this would not be con­
sidered a reasonable offer by Israel. It would be to Arafat's advan­
tage to go public with this set of proposals, gaining enormous public 
attention and tremenduous support worldwide. With this action Arafat 
could gain an image as the moderate champion of Palestinian inde­
pendence opposing expansionist Israel. 
Regardless of the political possibilities of this approach, it 
is unlikely that Arafat would be willing to make so many concessions 
merely to enter into a negotiating process that offers no strong pos-
sibilities for Palestinian success. (it would be extremely unlikely 
that Israel would be willing to negotiate with the PLO under any 
"^Arafat has conceded privately to the Saudia Arabians that he 
would accept UN Resolution 2^2 (which recognizes Israel's right to exist 
as a Middle East nation) if it were amended to include a statement 
affirming the national rights of the Palestinian people, and if the 
United States would support Palestinian self determination. See, Leon 
Wieseltier, "Interview with General Peled," New York Review of Books, 
23 February 1978, P. 17, for details. 
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circumstances, now, so Arsifat may not want to risk the loss of prestige 
caused by offering concessions totally ignored by Israel.) Once 
King Hussein has made the gesture to Arafat, he would be in a position 
to make thr* move for resolving the Palestinian issue. In order to be 
successful, Hussein is going to have to do some astute political 
maneuvering, for his situation is formidable. He is faced with an 
Israeli government bent on gaining control of as much of the West 
Bank as possible, a Palestinian populace which could be exi)ected to 
regard his move with outright hostility, and very little supjyart in 
the remainder of the Arab world. 
King Hussein's first step would be to gain support from Saudi 
Arabia. He would have to persuade the Saudis that the major objective 
of West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations would be gaining an inde­
pendent Palestinian state, and that he had the best chance of accom­
plishing this. The next step would be to announce publicly that he 
is entering the nescotiation process in an effort to gain national rights 
for the Palestinian people. Of course, the f^lestinians would be quite 
skeptical of such an announcement coming from Hussein, but it is 
important that Hussein ^et this statement on the public record, so he 
could gain at least a little support from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip Palestinians, The final step would be to conduct a propagsuida 
campaign in which Hussein could attempt to swing world-wide opinion 
behind his effort, gain some Arab support for his policy, and alleviate 
some of the Israelis* fears concerning the formation of a Palestinian 
state. 
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It would be to King Hussein's advantage to conclude the initial 
phase of the negotiations as quickly as possible and get some kind of 
Palestinian self governing body set up, which could act as a propaganda 
aigent promoting the cause of Palestinian independence. The most im­
portant concession for Hussein to gain in this initial phase of 
negotiations is a signed pledge freezing new settlement construction 
and old settlement expansion during the transition period to auton­
omous Palestinian self government. Obviously, Prime Minister Begin 
would not want to sign such an agreement, but the victory of getting 
Hussein to the negotiating table, the possibility of finally resolving 
the West Bank and Caza Strip issues, and the realization that he could 
count upon Labor Party support to offset opposition within his own 
party might make this somewhat acceptable to Begin, King Hussein and 
President SsuJat would have to bring treraenduous pressure to bear upon 
Begin (particularly by gaining US support for this crucial clause), 
and it is likely that they would have to make some sort of pledge 
which would leave open the jwssibility of Israeli settlement fol­
lowing the moritorium. The possibility of future Israeli settlement 
could be accomplished by Egypt's and Jordan's agreeing to a guarantee 
of the free migration of peoples following the conclusion of a final 
peace treaty. This arrangement would circumvent the Gush Emunim's 
efforts to colonize the West Bank, for without Israeli government 
support (military, logistical and land condemnation), these groups 
would be unable to expand their numbers currently in the territory, 
thus discouraging the settlers already there. 
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Once a provisional Pfeilestinian government is in place, the frame­
work calls for a 5 yeax transition period, with negotiations for the 
final resolution of the 2 territories to take place not later than 3 
years after the conclusion of the initial West Bank/Ceusa Strip 
negotiations. It is during this transition period the King Hussein 
is going to have to take the initiative. The first order of business 
is to gain extensive world-wide support for the Palestinian cause. 
The Palestinians already can count upon complete Third World support, 
and it would be quite simple to gain very strong support for the 
Palestinian cause in Western European countries (particularly with 
a little oil politics pressure applied). The crucial nation from 
which King Hussein must gain support is the United States, both in 
the presidency and in the public at large. It is absolutely essential 
for Hussein to persuade the US President! (l) that Jordan truly 
desires peace in the Middle East and fully accepts Israel as a Middle 
East nation, (2) that the only means through which this can be 
accomplished is the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and 
(3) that Jordan will coordinate actions with Israel to insure that 
this new Palestinian state poses no major threat to Israel or to the 
stability of the Middle East political situation. Also, King Hussein 
must conduct an extensive propaganda campaign in the United States 
demonstrating that the Palestinian claim to Mandated Palestine is 
certainly equal to Israel's claim (as has been shown in Chapter II), 
and that the Palestinians should not be denied what is granted to 
Israel, Furthermore, King Hussein has to convince the American public 
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that this Palestiniaui entity will commit itself to peaceful relations 
with Israel, This objective will be quite difficult to do (since 
most Palestinians do not appear to desire peaceful coexistence with 
Israel and say so in no uncertain terms), but Hussein should be able 
to keep the elected Palestinian f^oveming body from making provacative 
statements which would sabotage hopes for independence. President 
Sadat's efforts on behalf of this campaip:n would be sin important 
factor on Hussein's side, since Sadat has gained considerable credi­
bility in the eyes of the American public in the lajst year. 
Of equal importance to King Hussein is gaining strong Saudi 
Arabiain support for this course of action. King Hussein will have to 
convince the Saudis that his efforts hold the best chance of alleviating 
the Palestinian problem which so unstabilizes the Middle East (and 
which so concerns the Saudi Arabians with their large Palestinian 
work force), If Hussein can get momentum going in his campaign for 
Palestinian independence, he is in a position to gain some Palestinian 
support and demonstrate the potential of his policy to the Saudis, 
With Saudi support, Hussein is in a strong position to exert con­
siderable leverage within the United States, The Saudis can tie 
American support of Palestinian self determination to oil politics, 
and simply tell the US President that he is going to have to exert 
considerable political pressure on the Israelis to accept Palestinian 
self determination or risk having the SandIs rejoin the side of OPEC 
nations pushing for much higher oil price hikes than the Saudis have 
advocated previously. 
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The third objective that King Hussein has to accomplish is to 
keep things under control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, He has 
to demonsti^te that the Palestinian "governing body" is a legitimate 
authority. Since the Camp David framework allows for Jordanian 
"citizens" to participate in the Palestinian security forces and 
calls for joint Jordanian-Israeli patroDs, Hussein is in a strong 
position to exert force if necessary to maintain order in the areas 
administered by the Palestinian self governing authority. 
During the 5 year transition period several steps could be taken 
in the area of military withdrawals by Israel which would ease tensions 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. King Hussein should agree 
readily to the continuous presence of Israeli forces in areas of 
primary security concern to Israel, namely in the security belt 
region along the Jordan River and along Israel's narrow corridor 
region. However, Hussein should insist that the remaining areas of 
the West Bank be protected by Jordanlan-Iklestinian security forces. 
It would be advisable for Hussein to seek a compromise on this issue 
and allow implementation of Palestinian-Jordanian security arrange­
ments to be a gradual process which could be drawn out over the 
entire 5 year transition period, if necessary. This withdrawal of 
Israeli troops could be accomplished through a joint Israeli-Jordanian 
task force which would coordinate the transfer of Israeli military 
control to Jordanian control. The process could begin at the Jericho 
corridor between the West Bank and Jordan proper and spresui gradually 
(within 1 year) into the areas of high Arab population and no Israeli 
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settlements. 
The next, and most important, step for Kinf? Hussein would be to 
^aln transfer to Jordanian-Palestinijin security forces control over 
some areas containing Israeli settlements. King Hussein could argue 
that if Israelis and Palestinians are going to get along peacefully, 
as Israel has advocated for so many years, it is important for the 
Arabs to demonstrate their ability to uphold the rights of Jews under 
Arab administrative authority. This would be a strong argument sup­
porting Hussein's position, since an Israeli refusal to accept the 
proposal would provide strong evidence that Israel's primary concern 
is gaining control of West Bauik territory rather than seeking means 
through which Israeli citizens cjin be allowed to live in West Bank 
areas of religious and historical significance to Jews. If King Hussein 
wins this point (and his chances would be quite good), then it would 
be best to limit transfer of settlement security to a few isolated 
settlements, with the ones around Ramallah and along the Dead Sea 
being the most likely candidates. Since most Israeli settlers have 
shown little penchent for relating to their Arab neighbors, it is 
expected that this transfer of security responsibility would convince 
many of the settlers to abandon the effort and go back to Israel proper. 
In the Gaza Strip the arrangements would be quite similar, with 
the Jordanian-Palestinian security forces taking over most of the 
territory. The Israeli military forces could be restricted to the 
four paramilitary settlements in the territory, and a brigade-size 
force stationed along the Oaza Strip-Egypt boundary to provide security 
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along this crucial area. This Jordanian assumption of security 
measures for much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip area should not 
create many problems, Jordan certainly has ample reasons of its own 
to prevent terrorist activity from taking place, and the aggressive 
suppression of any terrorist activity in its zone of control would 
improve relations between Jordan and the one Middle East nation 
(Israel) that has a strong interest in seeing that Hashemite control 
of Jordan continues. The only other problem in security activity is 
riot control, and the gradual withdrawal of the Israelis would tend 
to negate the cause for riots in the first place. 
The conclusion of preliminary security negotiations would set 
the stage for the final phase of West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations. 
By this time if King Hussein has managed to halt any Israeli expansion 
into West Bank territory, and even turn it around slightly with the 
assumption of Ralestinian-Jordanian security for some Israeli settle­
ments, he may well have ended any Israeli hopes for the gradual 
absorption of the West Bank territory. Failure to accomplish this 
absorption would deal a severe blow to the exi)ansionist elements in 
Israel, and would most likely result in a swing towards accomodation 
and peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians as the prevaling politi­
cal climate within Israel, This development, coupled with a swing of 
world-wide public opinion behind the Palestinian cause, would give the 
Arab side the momentum going into the negotiations. In this situation 
Israel virtually would be forced to modify its strategy from one of 
denying Palestinian self determination to one of determining just what 
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conditions it will allow Palestinian nationalism to develop under 
and ultimately exist in. If» however, Kin^ Hussein and the Pales­
tinians enter negotiations in a weaJtened condition (due to an extreme 
split amon(:c Palestinians, lack of firm Saudi Arabian or American 
support, or Hussein's failure to curtail Prime Minister Begin*s ex­
pansionist activities), then Hussein would serve everyone's interests 
if he simply backed out of the entire negotiating process, leaving 
the Palestinians to work things out with Israel, The likely result 
of this situation would be one of the scenarios outlined at the con­
clusion of Chapter IV, The best the Palestinians could hope for 
would be to restrict the Israeli exi»,nsion as much as possible until 
the Palestinian demand for a state of their own would be accepted by 
Israel, 
In a situation in which Israel had to negotiate a i)eace settle­
ment rather than simply impose one, both the Israelis and the Pales­
tinians would be forced to abandon some long held positions, Israel 
would have to accept the inevitability of a Palestinian state, and 
the Palestinians (and Hussein) would have to accept the fact that not 
all of the occ'ipisd territory would be retvimed. Once the opposing 
sides adopted a realistic outlook, serious negotiations could begin. 
The primary issue to be resolved is the question of territory. 
Once a Palestinian state becomes a foregone conclusion of the Israeli 
government (the best that Israel could hope for would be Palestinian 
acceptance of independence to be granted at some point in time fol­
lowing the conclusion of the 5 year transition period, rather than 
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immediate independence), then Israel will have to decide (l) what 
areas it can afford to withdraw from without any problems, (2) which 
areas they might be able to withdraw from over an extended period of 
time, and (3) which areas must be annexed. 
In the first cate^^ory Israel could immediately include all of 
the West Bank areas under Jordanian control, as well as most of the 
Gaza Strip, Category two would include most of the remainder of the 
West Bank religious settlements, with the exception of the Kfir Etzonia 
cluster and some along the border of Israel proper in the narrow 
corridor region. Other areas placed in category two include the thin 
strip of territory running the width of the Gaza Strip-Egypt border, 
the security corridor region bordering the Dead Sea, and the in­
dustrial developments and settlements lying just outside the border 
of unified Jerusalem, Somewhere between categories two and three 
would be the security belt region along the Jordan River, the Kfir 
Etzonia religious settlement cluster, and the Tul Karm and Qalqilya 
regions along Israel's narrow corridor, Latrun would be the only 
area irreversibly committed to category three. 
The West Bank negotiations present some of the greatest polit­
ical difficulties for Israel, because it requires balancing its 
security needs and Gush Emunim*s expansionist demands with the need 
for accomodating Palestinian interests. In the Gaza Strip the Israeli 
problems are less acute. The Israeli government has fewer security 
concerns and historical interests to accomodate, so withdrawal can be 
made without creating major political difficulties. Initially, Israel 
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should put forth its maximum demands and work back from that point, 
A rou^^h estimate of this offer would be as follows» annexation of 
Latrun, a slight extension (2 or 3 miles) beyond the eastern boundary 
of unified Jerusalem, annexation of the Kfir Etzonia settlement region, 
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to include the newly proposed town of Ephrat, annexation of a strip 
of territory several miles wide running the length of Israel's narrow 
corridor region, and amnexation of the entire security belt region 
along the JoTdan River as well as the security belt along the Gaza 
Strip-Egypt border, Israel would agree to withdraw from the remainder 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, with the religious settle­
ments being left in place if the settlers desired to remain. 
Of course this offer would be completely unacceptable to the 
ftilestinians, but it would give Israel plenty of room to make con­
cessions, One would expect the Palestinians to counter with a demand 
for total Israeli withdrawal from both territories, and to continue 
making this demand until it became obvious that the Israelis would 
compromise no longer on territorial matters. At this point the 
Palestinians would have to switch their emphasis to the issue of 
self determination, making it abundantly clear to Israel that if it 
wanted any territorial compromises from the Palestinians, then Israel 
would have to compromise on the issue of Palestinian independence. 
In this arrangement, the Palestinians would be in a good position to 
gain independence immediately following the 5 year tramsition period 
Q 
A discussion about this proposed new town is contained in 
the Economist. 2? May 197B, p, 64, 
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or within a few years theregrfter, and they could exert leverage to 
prevent unwanted restrictions ujion their independence (such as re­
strictions on the sheer numbers of Palestinians allowed to return or 
exclusion of former PLO members from living in the territory). 
Once both sides indicated that they would be willing to make 
some compromises, then Israel could be«»in transferring some of the 
areas slated for annexation into areas slated for withdrawal over an 
extended period. The first areas placed into the withdrawal cate­
gory could be the Gaza Strip security belt, ]x>rtions of the Jordan 
River security belt, the area immediately adjacent to unified Jerusalem 
and some of the territory along Israel's narrow corridor region. With­
drawal could be completed from the area immediately adjacent to unified 
Jerusalem within a few years (since this is not a strategic area), suid 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip security belt region could be imple­
mented over a 5 year period, assuming that relations between Israel 
and Egypt remained friendly. In the security belt region along the 
Jordan River, Israel should adopt a policy of maintaining a presence 
only in the bare minimum needed for security considerations, Isirael 
could withdraw from all the civilian settlements along the Jordan 
River, returning this land back to the Arab farmers who lived there 
prior to the Israeli encroachment. 
This withdrawal along the Jordan Biver could be accomplished 
within a 3 year period, which would give Israel plenty of time to firm 
up its fortifications and improve its transportation network in the 
mountains above the valley floor. Withdrawing Israeli forces to the 
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high ground would insure minimal displacement of Arabs and leave 
Israel in an excellent position to block off any invasion from the west 
and to cut off supply lines between Jordan and Palestine in the event 
of major fipchtins^ between Israel and Palestine Arabs, Israel could 
demand annexation of the remaining security belt area» or could seek 
a long term (15 to 20 years) occupation arrangement, with the pos­
sibility of withdrawal being reconsidered at the conclusion of the 
term. The latter alternative might be preferable, since it would 
give Palestiniajis the hope of gaining control over this axes, event­
ually. If Israel were able to establish coirdial relations with Jordan 
and Palestine in the meantime, Israel would gain more in good will by 
withdrawing from the area than it would retain in security by staying. 
Once Israel granted the concenssions mentioned above, two areas 
of the West Bank would be slated for annexation. The latrun annexation 
is an obvious cosmetic adjxistment to the border and a necessary se­
curity arrangement for Israel, It would be pointless to attempt any 
other kind of arrangment here. The second area of annexation is a 
somewhat different story, Kfir Etzonia possesses little, if any, 
security value, but the area is of considerable historical significance. 
The Israeli government is going to have to make some concession to 
Gush Emunim and conservative expansionist interests in Israel, and 
the Kfir Etzonia area appears to be the primary candidate. It was 
the first West Bank area settled, it represents an attempt to revive 
a settlement that became a monument to Jewish courage during the War 
of Independence, and it is sui area close enough to Israel proper that 
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annexation can take place without inclusion of larpie chunks of West 
Bank territory (and lax^e numbers of West Bank Arabs) within Israel. 
This arranfcement would allow Israel to retain the four settlements in 
the area, as well as the proposed town of Ephrat, The aJinexation 
could be accomplished by includinf^ a small semi-circle of West Bamk 
territory, be^^inin^ just south of Beit Jala, extending: just outside 
Kfir Etzonia, and returning: to Israel proper. 
With the territorial questions out of the way, Israel could con­
centrate upon security arranprements. Much of Israel's West Bank 
security would be provided by the military fortifications alonp; the 
Jordan River security belt region, for the rest of its security Israel 
would have to depend upon demilitarization of the West Baoik and Gaza 
Strip, This arran^rement would not be very appealing to the Israelis 
(or the Palestinians either), who believe, quite ri^rhtly, that Israel 
could place no trust in the Palestinians to comply with the agreement. 
Still, the demilitarization could do an effective job of renderinpc the 
Palestinians an ineffectual military force. If the provisions of the 
arrangement limited Palestinians to a national police (but no military 
forces) restricted to sidearns and li^ht rifles (the Russian AK 47 they 
now use), the Palestinians could not pose any serious military threat 
to Israel, They would be denied any railitaory aircraft, motorized 
armored vehicles, artillery, rockets, heavy weapons (machine (sruns and 
anti-tank weapons), mines and p^renades of any kind. The Palestinians 
would have a very difficult time of importing tanks, planes or artil­
lery in any numbers before the Israelis became aware of it. The prob­
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lem that Israel would face would be the build up of lip:ht automatic 
rifles and the importation of anti-tank weapons. In any event, if 
the build up reached threateninp: porportions, Israel could move into 
the area and clean out the problem, since the Palestinians would not 
have the firepower to stop them. 
One of Israel's recurrlner fears concernini? axi independent 
Palestinian state is that it will be taken over immediately by the 
PLO, This is a le^ritlmate concern, since one would expect that the 
newly independent Palestinian state would select either PLO leaders 
or individuals acting as PLO spokesmen as the new ^rovernraent, Israel 
should Eidopt the view that the PLO is pjoln^ to take over re^reundless, 
and take necessary measures to keep the situation under control once 
this happens. Rather than attempt to keep the PLO out of the new 
Palestinian state, during negotiations Israel should make it clear to 
the Palestinian nes'otiators (and to the PIX) secretly) that Israel will 
allow PLO members to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the 
PLO is ^?oinfic to have to stop its terrorist activitj'' sind make a genuine 
effort at peaceful relations between Israel and Palestine (or whatever 
the Palestinians wish to call their new nation) or risk a renewal of 
Israeli occupation. Undoubtedly, the situation will be tense for some 
time, but if the two nations could maintain an uneasy peace for a short 
time (perhaps a year), the economic forces tieing the two nations to­
gether gradually would dispell much of the hostility and suspicion 
which exists between Palestinians and Israelis, 
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Syria 
One of the most important effects of Israel's policy of negotiat­
ing: the individual territories separately is to isolate Syria, Once 
that Ejrypt is out of the picture and Palestinian ne^rotiations are 
movinpr alone;, Syria's ability to exert pressure upon Israel "becomes 
very limited indeed. With Syria in an isolated position, Israel could 
conduct the Golan Heip:hts negotiations at whatever pace it wished. 
The central factor determining!: the pace of nepjotiations would be the 
attitude of Syria's President Assad, As lonp; as Assad maintained his 
bellip:erent attitude towjird Israel, the negotiations could be stalled 
indefinitely. If, on the other hand, Assad indicated that he no 
lonfcer wanted to commit Syria to einother war against Israel, the Israeli 
government could offer far more concessions in nepiotiations. 
Initially, Israel should seek a very limited withdrawal from the 
farthest reaches of occupied territory in the Golan Heifchts, This 
approach would allow Israel time (roughly 1 year) to complete the 
Sinai arransrements as well as most of the administrative arrangements 
for the 5 year interim period in the Gaza Strip and West Bemk, thus 
enablinpr Israel to determine what effect these developnents would have 
upon Assad, If Assad indicated that he was opposed to the direction 
ne^rotiations were takin/? and attempted to disrupt the process, then 
Israel could adopt a policy of beniprn neglect towgoti the Golem Heights 
issue. Should Assad indicate that he was resip:ned to ne^rotiating de­
velopments, then Israel could make a serious effort to resolve the 
dispute with Syria. 
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It is very likely that Assad would see that he had little choice 
but to ^o along with the course of negotiations, since it would be 
quite clear that he would sain nothinfc by opposing them. Once ne­
gotiations begin in earnest, Israel will have to confront the great 
difficulties that the Golan Heights situation presents. In this area 
Israel cannot insure effective security precautions without terri­
torial annexation, and any territorial annexation would eliminate any 
possibility for a gradual Syrian toleration of the Israeli presence In 
the Middle East, Perhaps the only negotiating policy that Israel can 
adopt in this territory is one of "a little bit of territory for a 
little bit of peace," Under this policy the question of total Israeli 
withdrawal would remain open during the course of negotiations; Israel 
would simply agree not to annex ajiy territory as long as negotiations 
continued. The determining factor in the continuation of the ne­
gotiating process would be the response of Syria to prelimingiry with­
drawal arrangements. As long as Syria made a conscious effort to 
comply with the demilitarization provisions of the preliminary agree­
ments, curtailed all shelling of Israeli positions, ajid stopped all 
terrorist attacks originating from Syrian territory, then the nego­
tiating process could move on to the next phase. If Syria failed to 
uphold its end of the agreement, Israel could break off negotiations 
and wait for Syria to change its attitude. 
In this arrangement the areas of the Golan Heights of particular 
interest to Israel or of heavy settlement concentrations become sig­
nificant not as areas of potential annexation but as points of with­
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drawal, Thust Israel would face minimal disruption of settlements 
durin^c an initial withdrawal of several miles, though it would require 
privinp: up the superb defensive area north of Quneitra. Since the ma­
jority of settlements and one of the most important strategic loca­
tions in the territory (the first line of hills above the Huleh Valley) 
lie quite close to Israel proper, Israel could continue this policy of 
limited withirawal over an extended period (say 10 years) before ser­
ious compromises would have to be made. These withdrawals could be 
done in 2 to 3 mile wide strips running the length (north and south) 
of the Golan Heights, As long as Syria complied with the requirements 
of the agreement, the process could continue, with the gradual return 
of Syrian residents to the area. It would be a good idea to maintain 
a slender (2 or 3 mile wide) buffer zone of UN forces between the 
Israeli lines and the areas occupied by Syrian civilians.(no Syrian 
military forces would be allowed to return to areas withdrawn from). 
In approximately 10 years Isi^el would be reaching the critical point 
beyond which withdrawal would require relenquishing all of the high 
ground in the area and abandoning the settlement cluster in the south­
western comer of the territory. The amount of time that it would take 
to accomplish the withdrawal up to this point would give Syria ample 
time to indicate the kind of future relationship it expected to have 
with Israel and also give Israel an opportunity to assess the chances 
for peaceful coexistence with Syria, If Syria had been faithful in 
living up to the requirements of the previous agreements, then Israel 
would be in a position to make a final withdrawal from the Golan Heights, 
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The advantage of this arrangement is that it frives time for 
Israel's obsessive concern with security to dissipate somewhat before 
p:reat demands are made upon the country. Also, it allows President 
Assad the possibility of reo:alnin^!: all of the occupied territory, 
which would remove most of the incentive for any further military 
action against Israel, The extended withdrawal period allows Israel 
to assess the existing Middle East political situation before enter­
ing any further Golan Heights withdrawal negotiations. Finally, it 
leaves Israel in a position to impose a settlement if Syria shows little 
inclination to opt for peaceful relations with Israel, 
Jeirusalem 
The Jerusalem issue is by far the most difficult issue to resolve. 
Virtually every Israeli leader of any consequence has made it unequiv-
ically clear that Jerusalem is the "heart and soul" of Israel, Teddy 
Kolleck, Mayor of Jerusalem, stated the Israeli position most accu­
rately when he commented that for all the other occupied territories, 
there are Israelis willing to give them up, but it would be very dif-
9 
ficult to find an Israeli willing to give up Jerusalem, To retain 
Jerusalem, though, creates enormous problems between Israel and the 
Arabs, The most difficult problem is that Jerusalem is a holy city 
for the Arabs as well, with their third most important shrine, the 
Temple Mount (Dome of the Rock) located within the old walled city. 
The second problem is that annexation requires inclusion of laorge 
^Teddy Kolleck, "Jerusalem," Foreign Affairs 55 (July i977)« 703* 
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numbers of Arabs living in Jerusalem, Hho have no desire to come under 
Israeli sovereignty. Since continuation of Israeli control over 
Jerusalem directly affects thousands of Arabs and indirectly affects 
the entire Arab Middle East, the difficulties of resolvin^^ the issue 
become apparent. 
One of the stron^rest arguments that Israel has made for Israeli 
control over a unified Jerusalem is the fact that they have demon­
strated a commitment to insuring the freedom of access for all religions 
to their particular holy places. When one contrasts this situation with 
the pre-1967 War conditions of a divided city separated by barbed wire, 
with the Jews denied access to the Wailing Wall and the Airab residents 
of Israel denied access to the Dome of the Rock, then it is easy to 
understand the Israelis' objections to retuminjer the city to a situation 
of divided sovereignty. It would be impossible to gain Israeli accept­
ance of any redivision of Jerusalem, and it would be equally imjwssible 
to gain Arab acceptance of full Israeli sovereignty over the area. 
Since Israel is in the position of control in Jerusalem (and is un­
likely to relenquish that position short of going to war), it appears 
that the best approach would be one of granting Israel's primary 
demand for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control, but one in which 
Israeli control over Arabs in the city would be limited and Arab holy 
places would be placed under autonomous Arab control. 
The first problem to resolve would be one of determining which 
parties would be represented at Jerusalem negotiations. It would be 
best to limit the number of Arab participants to a Jordamian represent­
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ative, an Efryptian representative, a small group representing East 
Jerusalem Arabs, and an Israeli representative. It would be advisable 
to brin^ in a Saudi Arabian representative if the Saudis could be 
persuaded to enter face to face negotiations with Israel, If the 
Saudis declined this offer, then they should have a representative 
who would act as a consultant member of the Arab delegation. This 
arrangement would provide adequate representation for Arab interests 
in Jerusalem, but would keep the hard line Arab faction out of the 
negotiating process. 
The negotiations would deal with four basic issuest sovereignty, 
territory, administration and the holy places. Since the basic assumj)-
tion underlying the peace process is the Jerusalem will remain a 
unified city, the most logical approach appears to be one which asks 
Israel to compromise in the areas of municipal administration and 
territory, while the Arabs are asked to compromise on the issue of 
sovereignty. One glance at a map of unified Jerusalem (see map on 
page 128) indicates that the area is far greater than is necessary to 
insure a unified Jerusalem, In fact the area Israel incorporated runs 
almost to Ramallah in the north and Bethlehem in the south. The best 
approach would be to redraw the city's boundaries roughly along the 
following lines, In the north the line could be drawn inunediateDy 
south of Ramat Eshkol and French Hill areas to the Israeli imposed 
eastern boundary. The eastern boundary could be kept Intact (or 
moved slightly westward if it proves to be a particular bone of con­
tention to the Arabs) to a point just north of Silwan, then moved 
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directly across to Israel proper. This boundary would include most 
of the built up area which makes up the contiguous city, and it would 
include virtually all of the holy places of any consequence. The 
boundary would preserve the unified city and the holy places within 
a singrle entity, while requirincc Israel to p:ive up all of its new 
developments in the area, except for the restoration done in the 
Jewish Quarter of the Old City, 
The administrative arran/c^ements for p:oveming Jerusalem would 
have to be somewhat complicated, A 1976 plan offered by Israel's 
Liberal Party proposed a form of dual sovereignty, with the separate 
Jewish and Arab areas being divided into relatively autonomous town­
ships under a federated municipal government which had specifically 
designated powers over the individual township,This plan appears 
to be the most fruitful approach, though it appeaurs that the fed­
erated arrangement could be limited to Arab townships, while keeping 
the Jewish areas under a unified administi^tion. Under this arrange­
ment unified municipal services could be continued, but the Arabs 
would retain considerable autonomy in managing their own affairs, with 
the authority of Jerusalem's municipal government being limited to 
strictly defined areas. In short, the Arab townships would retain all 
powers of government not specifically denied them by the municipal city 
charter. In fact it would be advisable to go so far as to restrict the 
use of tax revenues collected in Arab townships to the area itself, 
^®See Michael Brecher, "Jerusalemi Israel's Political Decisions, 
19^7"*1977»" The Middle East Journal 32 (Winter 1978)' 30» for an out­
line of this plan. 
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and to offer dual Palestinian-Israe]i citizenship to the Arab residents 
of Jerusalem, 
The problem of the holy places would not be too difficult to 
resolve, since Israel's current arranp'ements leave Muslims and 
Christians in virtual autonomous control of their particular holy 
places. This arran^rement could be continued, though modified some­
what according to the desires of the Christian and Arab bodies now 
administering the sites, and formalized by treaty. Determining the 
final arrangements for the Christian holy places should create little 
problem, but resolution of the Arab holy sites will require more com­
plicated arrangements simply because the Arab nations that would not 
open diplomatic relations with Israel following a peace agreement (this 
would include many of them) would refuse to allow their citizens to 
enter Israel, This problem could be side-stepped by forming a joint 
Israeli-Jerusalem Arab customs station at Jerusalem's western border 
which could separate visitors into two groups, those desiring to enter 
Israel, who would have to pass throutrh Israeli customs, and those who 
desired only to visit the Dome of the Rock shrine, who would be issued 
a temporary visa good for the Haram Sharif area only (this contains 
virtually all of the Arab holy places in Jerusalem), The latter cus­
toms arrangement could be administered by Jerusalem Arabs under the 
direction of the Muslim group tasked with administering the Dome of 
the Rock shrine. This arrangement would allow Arab visitors to wor­
ship at this sacred area without ever paRsin/r through Israeli customs, 




With the details of the settlement proposal out of the wayi two 
questions still remain to be answered: Will it be acceptable to the 
parties involved? and Will it work? The first question has been dis­
cussed at some len;?th in this chapter. It has been demonstrated that 
most of the primary objectives of the parties involved would be realized, 
Effypt would retrain the entire Sinai, Syria can retrain the entire Golgm 
Heijrhts if it adopts a policy of peaceful coexistence, at last 
the Palestinians' demand for self determination is realized, and Israel' 
is placed in a position to move from "secure" borders to accomodation 
of Arab interests to srain acceptance as a Middle East nation. The 
real problem of acceptance of this Middle East peace plan lies with 
Israel, Israel is asked to accept concessions that always have been 
unthinkable, includinpr removal of settlements, withdrawal of military 
forces from strate^cic areas, acceptance of an independent Palestinian 
state, and finally acceptance of the Palestine Liberation Orp-anization, 
The key to sraininf? any Israeli acceptance of these concessions is 
momentum in the ne^-otiatin^ process. If the i)ace of nepfotiations is 
such that the Israeli general public can bep:in to realize that genuine 
peace is a jxjssibility, that Israel can be accepted by Arab nations 
(most noticably E^rypt and Jordan), then the possibility for ̂ ainin^ 
Israeli acceptance of these concessions is much greater. One factor 
aidinp: this acceptance process is that many of these difficult 
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concessions are put off for an extended period, piiving time for a 
"climate of peace" to develop. This climate of peace is critical to 
the ne^otiatin/r process. Once that the possibility of peace is re­
alized and the hope for its accomplishment is accelerated, then the 
Israeli p:ovemraent can have much greater success in painins: public 
acceptance of concessions made to the Arab nations. 
The final question to be answered is? Will it work? In order to 
understand properly the likely results of the arrangjeraent outlined 
here, it should be understood that the purpose of this peace settle­
ment is not to bring stability to the Middle East but to provide for 
a realiprnnent of relationships amonp' Middle East nations. The basic 
divisions amon^^r the Arab states are so sireat that it is pointless to 
expect lonp; term stability to develop in the Middle East, What this 
peace settlement does, then, is provide a framework within which more 
practical national alignments can take place. The presence of Israel 
created an artificial unity among Arab states which tended to obscure 
the basic political and historical division among Arab nations. 
Certainly it is in the interest of Jordan and Egypt to preserve Israel's 
strong military presence in the Middle East, for Israel can provide 
economic benefit for Egypt and be in a position to lend military 
assistance to Jordan, It is to Saudi Arabia's advantage that the 
most powerful Middle East nation (militarily) is a non Arab state, 
heavily dependent upon outside source for oil and highly developed 
economically, which makes it an excellent area for investment of Saudi 
money and a possible source of military assistance in an emergency. 
13^ 
Even Syria's primary concern lies in enhancing* its Middle East position 
througfh continuation of its stabilizing role in Lebanon and in con­
centrating: its defense measures against its primary enemy, Iraq. 
The acceptance of Israel in the Middle East, then, allows other 
Arab nations to concentrate upon their own primary concernsi the 
domestic Economy in E;»ypt, the problem of the Palestinian minority in 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia's very real security concerns posed by radical 
Arab states and Iran, and Syria's concern over maintaining its position 
as a leader in the Arab world. The Pfeilestinians, of course, do have 
something to gain from the destruction of Israel, but the effort ex­
pended in achieving such an objective would, at the very least, disrupt 
efforts for desperately needed economic development, and, very likely, 
would lead to a renewal of subjugation under Israel. The Israeli-
Palestinian balance of strength is so overwhelmingly in Israel's favor 
that, should Palestine continue a policy of provocation, Israel could 
overrun the newly formed nation any time it chose to. It is very 
likely, then, that the signing of a final Middle East peace settlement 
would lead to the gradual acceptance of Israel, not because the hard 
line Arab states would slowly change their policy, but because the 
diminishment of the Israel issue would allow other historical, political, 
and economic rivalries to resurface in the Middle East, forcing these 
nations to concentrate their efforts upon more pressing issues. 
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